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ABSTRACT
When a government official defends a case before an international court,
whose interest should he/she be representing? In today’s era of expanding
international treaties that give standing to individual claimants, international courts
review the actions of different government actors through the yardsticks of
international law. The state is not unitary; alleged victims can bring international
claims against various government entities including the executive, the legislature,
the administrative branch, and the judiciary. Yet, the international legal defense of
government actions is in the hands of the executive power. This paper focuses on
the consequences of this centralization for inter-branch politics. It explores the
lessons learned in US constitutional law concerning the role that executive power
plays in defending the interests of the federal government before the Supreme
Court, and compares them with the experience of Latin American executives in
litigating cases before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR).
I. INTRODUCTION
International judicial proceedings are structured so that governments speak
to courts with one voice.1 And in most, if not every state, the executive branch is
1

Section 2 of Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties crystalized
the custom in international law of assuming that the State is represented by a single voice
mostly commonly expressed by the executive power in the form of Heads of State, Heads of

To Speak with One Voice

559

this voice. 2 Judicial proceedings typically do not allow other branches or
government officials to participate in the process. Yet, the governments of many
democracies, just as in the United States, operate under a system of formal
separation of powers and independent administrative agencies. State interests are
composed of a plethora of agendas formulated by diverse government actors.3 In
judicial proceedings the state may still be treated as a unit, but in practice the vast
majority of contemporary states are not close to “unitary.”4 Moreover, international
courts have moved beyond resolving exclusively inter-state conflicts involving
boundary disputes or war-related settlements.5 International judicial proceedings
today give individuals standing to bring claims that question the exercise of public
power at the domestic level.6 Presidents, legislative bodies, domestic courts, and
government agencies take actions that can be considered contrary to international

Government, and Ministers of Foreign Affairs. (“In virtue of their functions and without
having to produce full powers, the following are considered as representing their State: a)
Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purposes of
performing all acts relating to the conclusion of a treaty.”), Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 7, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. See also Mary Ellen O’Connell & Leonore VanderZee,
The History of International Adjudication, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
ADJUDICATION 40, 46-60 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1st ed. 2014). When the Permanent Court of
International Justice, the first permanent international adjudicative body, was designed in
1920, the rules of its proceedings assumed that when the representative of the state appears
before the court he/she would be defending the interest of the “state/nation.” See Karen J.
Alter, The Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals After the End of the Cold
War, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 63, 63–87 (Oxford Univ.
Press, 1st ed. 2014). The international courts that have followed since then have replicated
this general organization of the proceedings. Cesare P.R. Romano, Progress in International
Adjudication: Revisiting Hudson’s Assessment of the Future of International Courts, in
PROGRESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 433, 433–50 (Russell Miller & Rebecca Bratspies eds.
2008); ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF JURISTS, DOCUMENTS PRESENTED TO THE COMMITTEE
RELATING TO EXISTING PLANS FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A PERMANENT COURT OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 379 (1920).
2
Vienna Convention, supra note 1, Art. 7; Cesare P.R. Romano, A Taxonomy of
International Rule of Law Institutions, 2 J. INT'L. DISPUTE SETTL. 241, 275 (2011); MANLEY
O. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS: PAST AND FUTURE 128 (1944).
3
Erwin N. Griswold, The Office of the Solicitor General-Representing the Interests
of the United States before the Supreme Court, 34 MO. L. REV. 527, 530 (1969) (stating how
Solicitor General Erwin Griswold’s experience in the office was a “vivid realization of how
disparate the government’s legal interest have become.”).
4
By unitary I make reference to the idea that States behave like single units, as
opposed to being composed of different actors, sectors, agencies, regions, etc.
5
O’Connell & VanderZee, supra note 1, at 47–48; Alter, supra note 1, at 64;
HUDSON, supra note 2, at 18–31; Romano, supra note 1, at 438.
6
KAREN J. ALTER, THE NEW TERRAIN OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: COURTS, POLITICS,
RIGHTS 107–08 (Princeton Univ. Press 2014); Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of
Global Administrative Law, LAW CONTEMP. PROBL. 15, 56–57 (2005).
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law and are subject to challenge before a supranational court. 7 Yet, only the
presidents have the power to defend these actions. The officers who represent the
country have to decide how to put all those interests together and their litigation
strategies could leave some of those voices without a defense.
The primary claim of this paper is that the authority to argue the
international legality of government acts before international courts has an
important national political dimension rooted in present-day divisions of power
between an executive and other government actors. Executives can use their
authority to present claims in court in the name of the government to try to
maximize their power or advance their policy agenda. They can downplay certain
arguments or decline to defend certain acts at the expense of other branches’
interests.
The system of supranational human rights adjudication in Latin America
offers an opportunity to study the political tensions that emerge among branches
when the authority to present arguments in court is in the hands of the executive
power. For a few years now, the IACtHR has been acting as a supranational
constitutional court that seeks to impose an ius constitutionale commune on the
region.8 Part of this expansion includes an assertion of judicial supremacy that has
transformed it into a politically consequential court for the exercise of governmental
power at the domestic level. The IACtHR gives direct orders to domestic courts,
and leaves the acts of other government actors without legal effects. 9 In other
words, it is assuming similar functions to the ones performed by supreme or
constitutional courts.10 The court has used the American Convention of Human
Rights as an exemplar to which constitutional rights and doctrines in the region
7

ALTER, supra note 6, at 112; Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the Supranational
Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L. J. 1490, 1501–02 (2006); Stephan
Schill, International Investment Law and Comparative Public Law: An Introduction, 22 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 909, 919–20 (2010). See generally Gus Van Harten & Martin Loughlin, Investment
Treaty Arbitration as a Species of Global Administrative Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 121 (2006);
GUS VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW 147–48 (1st ed.
2007); Kingsbury et al., supra note 6. The United States has also faced international cases
dealing with acts of different government authorities. See e.g.,Ted Cruz, Defending US
Sovereignty, Separation of Powers, and Federalism in Medellin v. Texas, 33 HARV. J. L. PUB.
POL'Y 25 (2010).
8
Ariel E. Dulitzky, An Inter-American Constitutional Court-The Invention of the
Conventionality Control by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 50 TEX. INT'L L.J.
45, 68 (2015); Armin von Bogdandy, Ius Constitutionale Commune en América Latina: Una
Mirada a un Constitucionalismo Transformador, 34 Rev. Derecho del Estado 3, 30 (2015);
EDUARDO F. MAC-GREGOR & ALFONSO H. GARCIA, DIÁLOGO JURISPRUDENCIAL EN
DERECHOS HUMANOS ENTRE TRIBUNALES CONSTITUCIONALES Y CORTES INTERNACIONALES
350–51(Tirant lo Blanch 2013).
9
Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to Human Rights Violations: The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 351, 355–
87(2008); Gerald L. Neuman, Bi-Level Remedies for Human Rights Violations, 55 HARV.
INT'L L. J. 323, 325 (2014).
10
Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 46.
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should be compared. In this process of expansion, the most affected branch has
been the local judiciary.
To address the political impact of judicial proceedings, this paper builds
on US literature about socio-legal traditions and comparative constitutional
politics.11 It analyzes the adjudicatory systems from the perspective of the politics
behind the legal process, of the parties involved in it, and how this shapes the way
the system operates. 12 The literature in US constitutional law on the different
political variables that surround the Department of Justice’s (DOJ) defense of the
legal actions and interpretations of the executive branch before the Supreme Court
offers analytical tools that can be deployed to help understand similar phenomena
in international proceedings.13 At the heart of this US constitutional debate lies the
question of whether the President can be said to represent the interests of the entire
government, or even the entire executive branch. The officers at the DOJ may be
some of the most qualified legal experts, but “knowledge of the law does not equate
to knowledge of the interests of the United States.” 14 In both the domestic US
proceedings and the international proceedings we can focus on the way that
executives present legal arguments in court and review which branches benefit.15

11

See e.g., Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 L. SOC. REV. 95 (1974); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP IN U.S. HISTORY 1–28 (2007); CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS:
JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE (Diana Kapiszewski et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS].
12
Galanter, supra note 11; WHITTINGTON, supra note 11; CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS,
supra note 11.
13
Seth P. Waxman, Defending Congress, 79 N.C. L. REV. 1073, 1073, 1076 (2001);
Griswold, supra note 3, at 531; Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal
Government’s Chief Lawyer and Chief Litigator, or One among Many? 46 FORDHAM L. REV.
1049, 1066 (1978); Todd Lochner, The Relationship between the Office of Solicitor General
and the Independent Agencies: A Reevaluation, 49 VA. L. REV. 549 (1993); Neal Devins &
Saikrishna B. Prakash, The Indefensible Duty to Defend, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 507 (2012);
Neal Devins, Political Will and the Unitary Executive: What Makes an Independent Agency
Independent?, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 273, 275–78 (1993) [hereinafter Devins, Political Will
and the Unitary Executive]; Neal Devins, Unitariness and Independence: Solicitor General
Control over Independent Agency Litigation, 82 CAL. L. REV. 255 (1994) [hereinafter
Devins, Unitariness and Independence]; Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Uneasy Case for
Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 558 (2002)
[hereinafter Devins & Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal
Litigation]; Neal Devins & Michael Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White
House, and Agency Litigation Authority, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 205, 208–15 (1998)
[hereinafter Devins & Herz, The Battle That Never Was]; Amanda Frost, Congress in Court,
59 UCLA L. REV. 914 (2012); Tara Leigh Grove & Neal Devins, Congress’s (Limited) Power
to Represent Itself in Court, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 571 (2014).
14
Lochner, supra note 13, at 572.
15
By having a monopoly over the defense, executive powers can play for long-term
results—for decisions that have an impact on the internal distribution of power—rather than
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A comparative analysis of the Inter-American system and US
constitutional proceedings offers new answers to academic debates on the
separation of powers, the expansion of judicial supremacy, and the relations
between supranational and domestic courts. For comparative constitutional law
scholars who focus on the development of judicial supremacy, the findings
presented in this paper confirm research showing that political actors promote the
expansion of judicial supremacy as a way to advance their own agenda.16 Courts
become politically consequential institutions because other government branches
benefit from having a judicial body translate constitutional provisions into
guidelines for public life. 17 This paper adds to this literature by finding that
domestic political actors can also use the expansion of supranational adjudication
to limit the work of domestic judges. 18 This finding controverts the seminal
literature on judicial dialogues. 19 Most studies on this subject suggest that the
existence of supranational judicial bodies helps domestic judiciaries become more
independent and enhance their role in governance at the domestic level. 20

for outcomes in favor of the state/federal government in each particular case. Bell, supra
note 13, at 1056; Waxman, supra note 13, at 1074–76.
16
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 35 (2007) [hereinafter HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY]; Ran
Hirschl, From Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative Constitutional Studies, 11
INT'L J. CONST. L. 1, 5–7 (2013) [hereinafter Hirschl, From Comparative Constitutional Law
to Comparative Constitutional Studies]; Ran Hirschl, The New Constitutionalism and the
Judicialization of Pure Politics Worldwide, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 721, 721–23 (2006);
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 230–84; MARTIN M. SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE
AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS (1981) [hereinafter SHAPIRO, COURTS]; Martin Shapiro, Judicial
Review in Developed Democracies, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION 7 (2003) [hereinafter Shapiro,
Democracies].
17
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY, supra note 16, at 100–48; Hirschl, From
Comparative Constitutional Law to Comparative Constitutional Studies, supra note 16, at 1;
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 67–92.
18
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 289–93: J.H.H. Weiler, The
Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403 (1991).
19
The first articles on judicial dialogues were written by Anne-Marie Slaughter, A
Global Community of Courts, 44.1 HARV. INT'L L. J. 191 (2003); Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J.
273 (1997); Karen J. Alter, Explaining National Court Acceptance of European Court
Jurisprudence: A Critical Evaluation of Theories of Legal Integration, THE EUROPEAN
COURTS AND NATIONAL COURTS 228 (1998). For the contemporary views that build on the
literature see ALTER, supra note 6, at 112; see generally Paul B. Stephan, Courts on Courts:
Contracting for Engagement and Indifference in International Judicial Encounters, 100 Va.
L. Rev. 17, 110 (2014); Vicki C. Jackson, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A
TRANSNATIONAL ERA (Oxford Univ. Press 2010).
20
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 24; J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution:
The European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26 COMP. POL. STUD. 510, 523 (1994);
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19, at 282–84; Walter Mattli & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Law
and Politics in the European Union: A Reply to Garrett, 49 INT'L ORG. 183 (1995); Anne-
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According to this literature, supranational courts such as the European Court of
Justice or the European Court of Human Rights have made it difficult for domestic
political actors to “retaliate” against domestic judges for expanding their powers.21
The findings of this paper also show that the way the system operates today
upends the original impetus for the Inter-American system of human rights. In the
1980s, Latin America was slowly abandoning authoritarian regimes in which
executives and military governments had abused their powers.22 The designers of
the new constitutions—NGOs, academics, and officials—were highly influenced
by the European experience and by US legal liberal academics of the 1970s. 23
Following the same logic of the European-centered literature, they believed that the
constitutionalization of international human rights treaties and the creation of the
IACtHR would help domestic judges become more independent, and prevent
executive power from expanding again. The experience of the IACtHR presented
here reveals a different story—one in which the interests of the international court,
under certain circumstances, align with those of domestic executive actors to
control the domestic judiciary. The judicial proceeding before the IACtHR and the
centralization of the defense of the state are tools that allow these actors to restrain
local judges.
The organizational plan of the paper is as follows. Section I details the
theories of US constitutional adjudication that discuss the advantages and
disadvantages of centralizing the defense of the government into a single voice.24
Section II analyzes the consequences for inter-branch politics of this centralization.
The parallel of this story in the international context is the subject of the next two
sections. Section III begins with an assessment of the contours of the InterAmerican System of Human Rights and shows how its Court is assuming some of
the functions the US Supreme Court performs. The focus narrows in Section IV to
the cases in which the executives have decided not to defend acts of other
Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court; A Political Theory of Legal
Integration, 47 (Winter) INT'L ORG. 41, 42 (1993).
21
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 24.
22
Diana Kapiszewski & Matthew M. Taylor, Doing Courts Justice? Studying
Judicial Politics in Latin America, 6 PERSP. POL. 741, 741 (2008); ROBERTO GARGARELLA,
LATIN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, 1810-2010: THE ENGINE ROOM OF THE CONSTITUTION
148–49 (2013); Javier Couso, The Transformation of Constitutional Discourse and the
Judicialization of Politics in Latin America, CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND
POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN LATIN AMERICA 141 (2010).
23
Jorge L. Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), 1997 UTAH L. REV.
425, 464 (1997) [hereinafter Esquirol, The Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I)]; Jorge
L. Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law, 55 FLA. L. REV. 41, 51 (2003)
[hereinafter Esquirol, Continuing Fictions of Latin American Law]; Diego Eduardo & López
Medina, Teoría Impura del Derecho : la Transformación de la Cultura Jurídica
Latinoamericana, 4 CRITERIO JURIDICO 273 (2004); David M. Trubek, The “Rule of Law” in
Development Assistance: Past, Present and Future, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (2006); Couso, supra note 22, at 156.
24
This paper does not focus on the constitutional grounds of the centralization for the
legal defense government programs and actions.

564

Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law

Vol. 34, No. 3

2017

government branches or to downplay their defenses. This Section gives three
concrete cases of study that exemplify this phenomenon: the Caracazo case in
which the incoming President, Hugo Chavez Frias, recognized in the proceeding
the full responsibility of the state and used the decision of the IACtHR to begin a
series of domestic prosecutions against the previous political regime; 25 the Last
Temptation of Christ case in which the executive of Chile declined to defend the
content of the constitution and the doctrines of the domestic supreme court, and as
a consequence invited the IACtHR to order the state to modify domestic
constitutional order;26 and the Artavia v. Costa Rica case in which the IACtHR, as
a way to force compliance with its remedies, ordered reinstatement of an executive
decree that had previously been declared as unconstitutional by the supreme court
of Costa Rica. 27 The concluding Section assesses the contribution of doing a
comparative analysis between the US constitutional system of adjudication and the
IACtHR’s proceedings.
II. SPEAKING WITH ONE VOICE BEFORE THE US SUPREME COURT
The view that the executive branch is the most adequate branch to speak
on behalf of the government is often linked to the separations of powers doctrine.
According to historical accounts, the US founding fathers’ intention was to place a
single president at the head of the executive branch in order to ensure both its vigor
and political accountability.28 There are many ways in which the unitariness of the
executive is reflected in the powers of the president, but one is of stark importance
for our analysis. As part of the White House’s duty to execute the law, the defense
of the federal government before the Supreme Court is done by an officer in the
executive branch, the Solicitor General of the United States.29 When the DOJ was
created in 1870, there was a clear intention to centralize the legal activity of the
federal government into one office.30 The debates in Congress at that time show
25

Caracazo v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 58, ¶ 2 (Nov. 11, 1999) [hereinafter Caracazo Merits].
26
“The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, 18 (Feb. 5, 2001)
[hereinafter The Last Temptation of Christ Merits].
27
Artavia Murillo y Otros ("In vitro fertilization") v. Costa Rica, Monitoring
Compliance with Judgment, Order of the Court, “Desarrollo del Caso,” ¶ 13 (Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/fichas/artaviamurillo.pdf [hereinafter
Artavia Monitoring Compliance] (available only in Spanish).
28
MARK V. TUSHNET, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: A
CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS 94 (2015). This at least was Alexander Hamilton’s position in
Federalist No. 70, where he defends the unitariness needed in the executive power in order
to ensure energy, efficiency, and accountability in the federal government. THE FEDERALIST
NO. 70, 423–24 (Alexander Hamilton).
29
Bell, supra note 13, at 1050–60; Officer of the Solicitor General: General
Functions, 28 C.F.R. §§ 20–21 (2000).
30
Bell, supra note 13, at 1053.
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that centralization was perceived as a way to make the government’s legal affairs
more efficient, reduce expenses, and especially to “insure that the federal
government spoke with one voice in its view of and adherence to the law.”31
Four common contemporary arguments are made in literature in favor of
centralizing the defense of the government in one department.32 First, it is argued
that centralization helps avoid conflicting arguments from all the government actors
involved.33 Second, the executive is in the best position to determine the “longrange interest of the United States.”34 This point assumes that the interests of the
other agencies or powers are more parochial and individual.35 Third, the DOJ can
serve both as a mediator of interagency disputes and as a gatekeeper of cases for the
Supreme Court. 36 In sum, the Attorney General can help to filter disputes and
thereby aid the highest court. 37 Lastly, centralization in the executive power
benefits the entire federal government and its branches because the DOJ can build
a reputation and litigation expertise that will result in more beneficial decisions.38
In this view, the Solicitor General is not only an individual lawyer representing a
client, but also a repeat player who has an “institutional relationship of a continuing
nature” with the Court.39 This is positive in the long-term, even if the Solicitor
General must at times decide not to defend the interest of some governmental actors
in order to preserve it.40
Contemporary arguments against centralization are given by federal
agencies and Congress, which feel that at times their interests are not being
represented well or even taken into consideration. Congress has written letters to
31

Bell, supra note 13, at 1053; Griswold, supra note 3, at 529–30.
George F. Fraley III, Note, Is the Fox Watching the Henhouse: The
Administration’s Control of FEC Litigation Through the Solicitor General, 9 ADMIN. L. J.
AM. U. 1215, 1255–56 (1995) (Fraley in addition to the four advantages also argues that the
"expertise of the Solicitor general in Supreme Court litigation benefits the agency it
represents." In this point, as it will be discussed in the article, international litigation departs,
since at the international level the conflicts that arise are between branches of government
and not between agencies of the same branch."); Lochner, supra note 13, at 572.
33
Lochner, supra note 13, at 571; Bell, supra note 13, at 1058, 1060.
34
Bell, supra note 13, at 1059–60; Lochner, supra note 13, at 571; Griswold, supra
note 3, at 528, 535.
35
Lochner, supra note 13, at 572; Bell, supra note 13, at 1058–59.
36
Bell, supra note 13, at 1058; Waxman, supra note 13, at 1076–77.
37
Bell, supra note 13, at 1060–61; Griswold, supra note 3, at 535.
38
Bell, supra note 13, at 1061–62.
39
Griswold, supra note 3, at 534.
40
Id. (according to Griffin Griswold, the Solicitor General “must make a rather
difficult judgment: What should he ask the Court to decide; how much ought he to prevail
upon; what will be the effect of a particular position or decision in the case, not only upon
the government’s interest, narrowly considered, but upon the values and principles that
underlie and animate our system and upon the development of the law in general. These are
considerations which rarely enter into the professional processes of private litigation, but
they are factors which must always be carefully considered by the Office of the Solicitor
General.”)
32
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the DOJ complaining about the “lackluster and unenthusiastic”41 defense of federal
legislation and deploring the practice of defending the interest of the executive over
those of the other branches of government.42 As Griffin Bell, a former Attorney
General, explained, “the DOJ’s efforts to ensure uniformity in government litigating
postures can constitute a real threat to them.”43
The following subsections make the case that the DOJ has developed
certain practices to try to mediate the conflicting interests of the federal branches,
but that the President always retains the upper hand in defining the litigation
strategies in those cases in which he has a special interest. Yet, this has not
prevented the Supreme Court from hearing arguments in favor of other branches of
government. In many cases members of Congress have presented amicus briefs
expressing opposing views to the ones presented by the DOJ. Moreover, private
litigants, when arguing against actions taken by the President, have based part of
their claims on the fact that the actions needed congressional approval or that the
powers belonged to Congress.
A. Litigation Strategies to Represent Inter-Branch Interests
There are different ways in which conflicting views among the
Administration, Congress, and the federal agencies can be manifested in the DOJ’s
litigation strategies. For example, the Solicitor General might present a brief on
behalf of the United States, but the DOJ might also submit an amicus brief with a
different position more aligned with the executive’s interest. The Solicitor General
might decide not to appeal a case where an agency is involved or even petition for
a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, leaving the agency’s interests without an
opportunity to be considered by the highest court.44 The Solicitor General might

41
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1082 n. 35 (citing the remarks of Sen. James Abourezk
regarding the Solicitor General’s defense of the Voting Rights Act).
42
Id. at 1082 (documenting the statements against Solicitor General Bork and his
defense in Buckley v. Valeo).
43
Bell, supra note 13, at 1058. See also CORNELL W. CLAYTON, THE POLITICS OF
JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY 55–56 (1992) (“The
majority of recent Solicitors General would agree that the office owes allegiance to the
Supreme Court as well as to the executive . . . . The court reciprocates this relationship. The
Solicitor General provides accurate and complete representations and assistance in selecting
meritorious cases; the Supreme Court extends to the Solicitor General special privileges and
confidence that no other litigant enjoys. This commonality of interest between the Solicitor
General and Supreme Court led Professor Katheryn Werdagar to describe the Solicitor
General as the Court’s ‘ninth and a half Justice.’”)
44
Bell, supra note 13, at 1066 (“He is also responsible for deciding whether lower
court decisions adverse to the Government should be appealed, and whether the Government
should file amicus curiae briefs in cases to which it is not a party.”); Griswold, supra note 3,
at 531; Adam D. Chandler, The Solicitor General of the United States: Tenth Justice or
Zealous Advocate?, 121 YALE L. J. 725, 725 (2011) (“Acting as the final ‘decider’ on the
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present a brief with certain arguments on behalf of the United States, but also
express his concerns with them in sections of the brief, such as footnotes,45 or in
oral argument.46
In the most extreme cases, the executive branch can decline to defend, or
downplay certain defenses, if an act of Congress or an agency is constitutionally
challenged. 47 For example, the Solicitor General can present the two views,
Congress’ or the agency’s, and the President’s, signaling the Court that there is
disagreement among branches; or, the Solicitor General actively and exclusively
argues against the constitutionality of the congressional act. 48 Regarding the first
overwhelming majority of federal appeals, the Solicitor General has a vast and
underscrutinized amount of discretion over the federal government’s legal agenda.”).
45
Eric Schnapper, Becket at the Bar–The Conflicting Obligations of the Solicitor
General, 21 LOY. L. REV. 1187, 1187 (arguing that in the 1983 case of Bon Jones University
v. United States the Solicitor General’s contradictory roles were reflected when he stated, in
a footnote to the government’s brief, his disagreement with the administration’s position).
See also Brief for the United States at 1, Goldboto Christian Schools, Inc. v. United States,
454 U.S. 892 (1981) (No. 81-1); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (No.
81-3); CLAYTON, supra note 43, at 54–55 (arguing that this practice started with Solicitor
General Thomas Thatcher who would insert footnotes in the briefs to disassociate himself
from the arguments presented by the agencies or the Justice Department as a way to “clue in
the justices;” also an excellent example for him was the Bob Jones University where Solicitor
General Wallace’s note was caught by the Justices as a “red light and, by an eight-to-one
margin, rejected the administration’s argument and upheld the IRS’s position.”).
46
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1082 n.35 (citing Solicitor General James M. Baker’s
brief in Miles v. Graham: “The Solicitor General takes no satisfaction in presenting this
argument for the consideration of the court . . . . Congress, however, has shown its
unmistakable intention to subject these inadequate salaries to a tax. As able counsel have
and will argue the invalidity of the tax, it is fair to Congress—and, indeed, it is fair to this
court—that the other view of constitutional power should be fully and fairly presented, and
this I have endeavored to do.”).
47
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 207–10 (discussing the example of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 where President Clinton decided not to veto the last minute
amendment (Communications Decency Act), and waited for the case to reach the Supreme
Court to instruct the Department of Justice to defend the case only as long as it was
“consistent with Supreme Court rulings in this area,” in other words it downplayed the
defenses of the Act–Reno American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997)); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Presidential Non-Enforcement of Constitutionally Objectionable Statutes, 63 L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 13 (2000) (another example is given by Johnsen when President Clinton
decided not to veto the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996 that
included a provision requiring the armed forces to discharge individuals infected with HIV,
and instead announced that it would not defend the bill before the Supreme Court); Griswold,
supra note 3, at 535 (“In providing for the Solicitor General, subject to the discretion of the
Attorney General, to attend to the ‘interest of the United States’ in litigation, the statutes have
always been understood to mean the long-range interest of the United States . . . .
Occasionally, the Solicitor General finds it necessary to ‘confess error,’ when he concludes
that he cannot defend a judgment in favor of the government.”).
48
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1080–81 (giving an example of a case against
provisions of the Medicare and Medicaid Acts that gave a special treatment to Christian

568

Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law

Vol. 34, No. 3

2017

category of cases, presenting both positions, the White House might have been in
disagreement with the content of the law when it was being negotiated but did not
have the political capital to exercise his veto power. 49 In these cases, the
Administration might have even signed and executed a law that he considered to be
unconstitutional.50 When the case reaches the Supreme Court, the Solicitor General
not only gives arguments defending the constitutionality of the law, but also informs
the Court of the White House’s views questioning the statute’s constitutionality.51
The Solicitor General can do so either in oral arguments (i.e. Oregon v. Mitchell),52
or in two separate briefs (i.e. Buckley v. Valeo).53

Science nursing services in which the district court found the provisions unconstitutional,
even though the DOJ Civil Division had defended their constitutionality, and when the
Solicitor General had to decide on whether or not to appeal, “he considered it a bridge just
too far to cross.”).
49
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1079 n.14 (“Unlike a decision not to enforce a statute
at all, the practice of ‘enforce but decline to defend’ permits the will of Congress to be
honored in the first instance, allows the Executive Branch to make its views known to the
Court, and ordinarily places before the court the opportunity to resolve the constitutional
dispute between the other two branches. Some commentators, argue that the enforce-butdecline-to-defend equilibrium represents in many cases constitutionalism at its best, because
it forces the Executive Branch to put its money where its (constitutional) mouth is and test
those views in the crucible of Supreme Court litigation.”).
50
Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 514–15.
51
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1081–82 (“On a rare occasion the President may sign,
and even execute, a law he considered to be unconstitutional. When that happens, the
Solicitor General is in an odd position.”).
52
Id. (“In Oregon v. Mitchell, for example, Solicitor General Erwin Griswold has to
determine whether to defend a provision of the Voting Rights Act that lowered the voting
age to eighteen in state and local elections. President Nixon strongly favored lowering the
voting age, but as his signing statement reflected, he ‘believe[d] – along with most of the
National’s leading constitutional scholars – that Congress has no power to enact [the
eighteen-year old voting age] by simple statute.’ Griswold concluded that reasonable
arguments could be made for the statute’s constitutionality, and he defended the voting age
provision in the Supreme Court accordingly. He began his oral argument, however, by
informing the Court of the views of the President and of the Department of Justice
questioning the statute’s constitutionality and urged the Court to ‘give consideration to these
views.’ In a close vote, the Court struck down the law. Griswold’s approach was lauded by
some as admirable candor; it was attacked by others as half-hearted advocacy.”); 400 U.S.
112 (1970).
53
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1082 (“Buckley v. Valeo—the Court’s landmark
decision on campaign finance regulation—cast Solicitor General Griswold’s successor in an
even more unusual posture. In that case, Solicitor General Robert Bork and Attorney General
Edward Levi filed an eighty-five page brief in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Attorney
General and the Federal Election Commission as parties. The brief elegantly put forward the
best First Amendment defense of the contribution and expenditure limitations of the Federal
Election Campaign Act. Simultaneously, however, the Attorney General and Solicitor
General filed a separate brief, also persuasive, on behalf of the Attorney General as appellee
and the United States as amicus curiae, presenting a different, ninety-five page discussion of
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Regarding the second type of cases, the Solicitor General declines to make
respectable arguments defending the constitutionality of the law even when these
are available.54 According to former Solicitor General, Seth Waxman, this typically
occurs “in cases in which it is manifest that the President has concluded that the
statute is unconstitutional.”55 Some of the cases that fall under this category are
those where the president’s veto was exercised but Congress was able to override.56
Litigation before the Supreme Court becomes a second chance for the White House
to confront its policy views with the ones taken by the majority in Congress.57 It is
common to find in these type of situations that the underlying conflict is not only
policy related, but also involves the interpretation of each branches’ powers. 58
These cases tend to leave the road open for the Supreme Court to expand its views
because it knows that at least one other branch will agree with its interpretation.59
Finally, another extreme position can be found in cases in which the Solicitor
General openly “confessing error” in a case previously won by the government and
requests the Supreme Court to overturn the lower court or its own decision.60 This

the First Amendment issues in a manner that ‘attempt[ed] to assist in analysis without
pointing the way to particular conclusions’”); 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
54
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1083 (giving first an example of a 1990 amicus brief
filed by the United States in the Metro Broadcasting v. FCC case where instead of defending
the constitutionality of statutory provisions regarding the regulatory preferences of the
Federal Communications Commission; the second example he gives is brief filed by the DOJ
in the Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC regarding the constitutionality of the “mustcarry” provisions of the Cable Television Act of 1992).
55
Id. (“[T]he Department of Justice has occasionally declined to make professionally
respectable arguments, even when available, to defend a statute–typically, in cases in which
it is manifest that the president has concluded that the statute is unconstitutional.”).
56
Id. at 1084.
57
Id.
58
Id. (“[I]t is not surprising that the President and Congress occasionally find
themselves at odds regarding the proper interpretation of their own, and each other’s,
constitutional powers [and] [i]n that event, the Solicitor General ordinarily defends the
President’s powers and prerogatives.”).
59
Griswold, supra note 3, at 536.
60
Neal Kumar Katyal, The Solicitor General and Confession of Error, 81 FORDHAM
L. REV. 3027, 3030–31 (2012) (explaining how the confession of error is not a rare practice
of the solicitor general: “[s]ince Taft, all Solicitors General—it doesn’t matter whether they
are appointed by a Republican or a Democrat—have confessed error, roughly at the pace of
two to three times per Supreme Court term.”); CLAYTON, supra note 43, at 56 (“Confession
of error often places the Solicitor General in a delicate position. He must betray both the
government lawyers who won the case in the lower courts and the judge whose decision the
Solicitor General wants reversed. The practice, however, underscore the relationship between
the Solicitor General and Court. Confessing error, Archival Cox said, ‘tests the strength of
our belief that the office has peculiar responsibility to the Court.’ Cox took this responsibility
so seriously that, in one antitrust suit, he amazed the Justices by arguing both sides of the
case.”).
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later case to some may be considered “the noblest function of the office,” but to
others, especially judges, “is the lowest trick one lawyer can play on another.”61
1. Defending Congress: Congressional Standing, Amicus Brief, and
Private Parties
As mentioned in the previous section, Congress has tried to exercise
pressure on the DOJ to defend its interest, but the influence of the President is
greater than the individual and divided voices of the members of Congress. Perhaps
the fact that Congress has been constantly divided between parties weakens its
possibility of enhancing its voice. It is hard to find examples in history when all
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate have agreed on what needs
to be defended in a particular case. Most of the briefs presented on behalf of the
legislative branch recognize that the positions are taken on a “majoritarian basis
when consensus cannot be achieved.” 62 The fact remains that when the DOJ
declines to defend an act from Congress, the only defense left available to the
members of this body who disagree with the DOJ’s position is to file an amicus
brief.63
The first time Congress was forced to voice its interest in an amicus brief
was in 1926 in Myres v. United States.64 This case involved a statute that limited
the president’s power to remove officials in the federal government. When the
Solicitor General declined to defend the statute, the Supreme Court appointed
Senator George Wharton Pepper to present an amicus brief in favor of the legislative
branch’s interest. But Chief Justice Taft concluded that the power to remove
appointed officers is vested in the president alone. 65 According to Justice Taft, a
contrary interpretation would not allow him to “discharge his own constitutional
duty of seeing that the laws be faithfully executed.”66
Another widely cited example of a “decline to decide” situation that
involved a separation of powers issue is INS v. Chadha.67 In this particular case,
61

Griswold, supra note 3, at 535–36 (“This authority is, of course, sparingly
exercised. Confessing error is a little bit like taking medicine: its basic purpose and ultimate
effect are highly salubrious, but it may have a bitter taste for a moment going down. Judge
Simon Sobeloff, who is a former Solicitor General, and now a distinguished circuit judge, is
quoted as saying: ‘when I was Solicitor General, I thought that confessing error was the
noblest function of the office. Now that I am a Circuit Judge, I know it is the lowest trick
one lawyer can play on another.’ Other circuit judges who, at the urging of the government
in their court, have delivered an opinion which the Solicitor General refused to defend,
sometimes react somewhat more vigorously, I may add.”); Katyal, supra note 60, at 3030.
62
Brief for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Groups of the United States House of
Representatives, at 3 n.*, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (2012) (No. 12307).
63
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1084.
64
Id. at 1085. See also Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
65
Myers, 272 U.S. at 119.
66
Id. at 115.
67
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Waxman, supra note 13, at 1084.
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the DOJ declined to defend the constitutionality of a provision that gave Congress
a one-House veto over the Immigration and Naturalization Service’s decisions on
deportable aliens.68 There, the Court sided with the executive, and held that the
legislative act violated the standards set up by the Constitution regarding lawmaking
and congressional authority. In the end, the President and Attorney General
retained their discretion to deport foreign nationals as part of its duty to execute the
law.
Most recently, the DOJ under the Obama administration filed a brief
against the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in United States v. Windsor, openly
contradicting Congress’s position.69 Through the enactment of DOMA Congress
decided to define “marriage” and “spouse” as excluding same-sex couples.70 In
practice this act amended Chapter 1 of title 1 of the United States Code, which
provides rules of construction for all federal legislation and regulation—including
the tax code.71 The case arose when a widow of a same-sex couple tried to claim a
federal estate tax exemption for surviving spouses and the Internal Revenue Service
denied the refund based on DOMA. One of the key issues in this case discussed
before the Supreme Court dealt precisely with the scope of Congressional standing
when the executive decides not to defend an act of Congress.72 This was generated
by the fact that while the case was pending in a District Court, the Attorney General
notified the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the DOJ would no longer
defend the constitutionality of the section of the bill that prevented same-sex
spouses from claiming federal estate tax exemptions. 73 The Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the House of Representatives, that did not include the support
of the Democratic Party leadership, decided then to present a brief defending
Congress’s act.74 The lower courts permitted the congressional intervention, but
ruled in favor of the claimant and ordered the Treasury to refund Ms. Windsor. In
this case, two of the questions that the Court had to decide was whether the
68

Waxman, supra note 13, at 1084 n.53.
Laurence H. Tribe & Joshua Matz, The Constitutional Inevitability of Same-Sex
Marriage, 71 MD. L. REV. 471, 473 (2011).
70
Richard Epstein, Dumb on DOMA, RICOCHET (Feb. 24, 2011),
https://ricochet.com/archives/dumb-on-doma/; Michael Klarman, Commentary: The
Supreme Court and marriage for same-sex couples - Part I, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 15, 2015),
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/04/commentary-the-supreme-court-and-marriage-forsame-sex-couples-part-i/ (describing the history in the United States surrounding DOMA and
same-sex marriage).
71
DOMA § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (28 U.S.C. 1738C) (“In determining the meaning of
any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word “marriage” means only a
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse”
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife”).
72
Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 508–10; Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at
628.
73
Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 508 & n.1.
74
Brief for the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Groups of the United States house of
Representatives, at 3 n*, Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394 (2012) (No 12-307).
69
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bipartisan group had standing in the case and whether the executive branch’s
agreement with the lower court’s decision regarding the unconstitutionality of
DOMA deprived the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the merits of the
case. 75 In a divided opinion, the majority of the Court agreed that the US
government retained a significant stake in the issue because it could suffer a real
economic injury and therefore it supported its jurisdiction. On the merits of the
case, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the claimant, and consequently agreed
with the executive’s position regarding the unconstitutionality of DOMA.76
Finally, private parties can also present arguments in favor of
congressional power when challenging actions from the executive power. One of
the most famous cases where this issue was present is the 1952 case of Youngstown
Co. v. Sawyer, also referred as the Steel Seizure Case.77 There, the Court had to
decide whether the president’s war power as commander-in-chief of the armed
forces included the possibility of seizing private property. 78 In 1950, President
Harry Truman sent troops to Korea without asking for a Congressional declaration
of war. As part of the war effort, Truman created a Wage Stabilization Board to
avoid inflation and labor disputes during the armed conflict. The major steel
producers disagreed with the board’s proposed wage and threated to strike. The
White House, through an executive order, decided to seize and operate the main
production facilities in order to prevent dislocations in the fabrication of all
weapons and war materials necessary for the troops in Korea.79 The owners of the
steel mills brought a claim against the executive action and argued that the President
lacked the power to seize their property absent a Congressional approval or an
enumerated authority under Article II of the Constitution. 80 Congress did not
present an amicus brief in this case nor react after the President issued the executive
order that seized the steel mills. Yet, the arguments in favor of Congress presented
by the private litigators were an indirect defense of Congressional powers.81 The
Court’s final decision sided with the claimants and argued that the President had
not been authorized by the Constitution or by a Congressional act to take such
actions.82
Even though Congress’s power was defended in this case, it is also
important to note that the potential for private litigants to become the defenders of
75

United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684 (2013).
Bethany R. Pickett, Will the Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional
Standing in Instances of Presidential Nonenforcement, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 463 (2015);
Frost, supra note 13, at 952; Nat Stern, The Indefinite Deflection of Congressional Standing,
43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 2 (2015); Daniel J. Meltzer, Executive Defense of Congressional Acts, 61
DUKE L. J. 1183, 1195 (2011); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing Outside of Article III, 162 U. PA.
L. REV. 1311, 1343 (2013); Grove & Devins, supra note 13, at 596; Abner S. Greene,
Interpretive Schizophrenia: How Congressional Standing Can Solve the Enforce-but-NotDefend Problem, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 577 (2012).
77
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 578, 582 (1952).
78
Id.
79
Id. at 583.
80
Id. at 587–89.
81
Id. at 588–89.
82
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 588–89.
76
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Congress’s powers is contingent on the strategy that serves the private actors best
interest. The fact that at times private actors can use a separation of powers defense
does not entail that Congress will always be defended or that its agenda will be
reflected in the private actor’s defense. The private litigators at the end do not have
to consult Congress or prepare a joint defense with its member when drafting their
arguments. In these cases, the defense of Congress is a byproduct of the defense of
private interest, not an end in and of itself.
III. POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE CENTRALIZATION OF THE
LEGAL DEFENSE OF GOVERNMENT ACTS
The previous section explained how the US system of constitutional
adjudication centralizes the legal defense of the interest of the state in one branch
of government, the tensions that emerge, and its manifestations in the litigation
strategies of the DOJ. Even though Congress or the agencies can participate in the
adjudicatory process by voicing their concerns in amicus briefs, and even though
private parties can also present arguments in their favor, the executive has ultimate
control of the official position of the government. This branch can decide to decline
to defend an act from another branch if it serves its interest. The following section
seeks to explain the political effects of this executive power. It reviews the judicial
proceeding from the eyes of the players and how they can shape the way
constitutional adjudication develops.
Regardless of whether a judicial body is international or national, its
decisions are not only the result of the judge’s interpretation, but also reflections of
the litigation process, the parties involved in it, and the political context in which
they operate. Judicial orders depend partly on the arguments brought by the parties
and are somewhat controlled by them. A bad defense or a mild argument in
constitutional adjudication can be considered as invitations for judicial expansion.
What is defended is in itself a strategic choice by the parties who tend to be repeat
players;83 especially if we consider that the political actor that is affected by the
decision is not the party defending the actions but rather another government
branch. As mentioned in the introduction, there is a troubling assumption in the
constitutional and international adjudicatory system that it is always in the interest
of the defending party to make the best arguments available. Yet when it comes to
defending governments in the contemporary constitutional and international
regimes, many institutions are involved but not all of them participate in a given
case.
The idea that litigation strategies explain the decisions rendered by courts
builds on American socio-legal traditions that view litigation as an opportunity for
participants to gain advantages.84 Courts and rules are just one part of the story.
What the parties win or lose, even by losing the case, is the other part of the power
83
84

Galanter, supra note 11, at 98.
Id. at 99–100.
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of litigation.85 It is an analytical switch from reviewing how the law is drafted and
applied to how the characteristics of the parties affect how the legal system works.86
Under this approach winning a case might not always be in the best interest for the
litigating party.87
A. Executives Using Judicial Supremacy to Expand their Powers.
According to political scientist and judicial historian Professor Keith
Whittington, what has made the US Supreme Court a politically consequential
institution is its assertion of judicial supremacy. 88 This is the power to be the
ultimate actor to define “effective constitutional meaning such that other
government officials are bound to adhere not only to the Court’s disposition of a
specific case but also to the Court’s constitutional reasoning.”89 Judicial review is
the power to refuse to give force to an act of other government actors in the context
of a particular case.90 Judicial supremacy “requires deference by other government
officials to the constitutional dictates of the Court, even when other government

85

Galanter, supra note 11, at 113–14.
Alvaro Santos, Carving out Policy Autonomy for Developing Countries in the
World Trade Organization: The Experience of Brazil and Mexico, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 551, 572
(2012).
87
Id. at 571–77 (discussing the same approach with WTO cases where states seek to
change the international rule that would reflect its interest, even if they lose the particular
case).
88
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 6–7 (“The concept of judicial supremacy does not
focus on the specific act of review itself. Judicial supremacy refers to the ‘obligation of
coordinate officials not only to obey that [judicial] ruling but to follow its reasoning in future
deliberations.’ A model of judicial supremacy posits that the Court does not merely resolve
particular disputes involving the litigants directly before them or elsewhere in the judicial
system. It also authoritatively interprets constitutional meaning. For the judicial supremacist,
the Court defines effective constitutional meaning such that other government officials are
bound to adhere not only to the Court’s disposition of a specific case but also to the Court’s
constitutional reasoning. Judicial supremacy requires deference by other government
officials to the constitutional dictates of the Court, even when other government officials
think that the Court is substantively wrong about the meaning of the Constitution and in
circumstances that are not subject to judicial review. Judicial supremacy asserts that the
Constitution is what the judges say it is, not because the Constitution has no objective
meaning or that courts could not be wrong but because there is no alternative interpretive
authority beyond the Court. As Justice Robert Jackson once ironically noted to somewhat
different effect, ‘We are not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because
we are final.’”).
89
Id.
90
Id. at 6 (“The doctrine of judicial review refers to the authority of a court, in the
context of deciding a particular case, to refuse to give force to an act of another governmental
institution on the grounds that such an act is contrary to the requirements of the
Constitution.”).
86
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officials think that the Court is substantively wrong about the meaning of the
Constitution and in circumstances that are not subject to judicial review.” 91
Using historical examples, Whittington argues that the expansion of
judicial supremacy was made possible by the acquiescence of other government
officials who benefited from having the Supreme Court impose particular
constitutional understandings on the legislative branch or state governments. 92
According to his analysis, the Supreme Court’s assertion of judicial supremacy has
helped the executive to maintain political coalitions and face complications for
political action created in a system of fragmented power.93 This is clear in what
Wittington classifies as “preemptive presidencies.” 94 These are oppositional
presidents who face strong political obstacles and have a hard time asserting their
authority to define the content of the Constitution in order to advance their policy
objectives.95 Lacking the political capital to do so, they “borrow from the authority
of the courts in order to hold off their political adversaries . . . . [R]ather than
challenge judicial authority, these presidents have often bolstered judicial authority
and then sought to align themselves with the courts against Congress.”96
This is where the monopoly over the defense of the state as described in
the previous section is key. As mentioned above, one political tool available to the
Administration is its control of the official position of the federal government on
the issues being discussed in the federal courts. 97 The President might reach a
compromise with Congress on certain policy issues, but then downplay certain
defenses and hope that the Supreme Court might be more sympathetic with his
position and strike down the sections that he had to approve in the compromise but
was never really committed to.98 Moreover, the White House can instruct the DOJ
to decline to defend the act of Congress or the agency arguing that it considers the
defense as constitutionally questionable, sending a clear signal to the Court that it
can expand its judicial supremacy powers. 99 For the reasons expressed in the
91

WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 7.
Id.
93
Id. at 27.
94
Id. at 195.
95
Id.
96
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 195.
97
Id. at 196.
98
Id. at 206–09 (using the example of Clinton’s position to the CDA in the
telecommunications reform). The CDA was a section of the Bill that Clinton disapproved of
but had to agree to in order to pass the rest of the legislation, and when it eventually reached
court, the DOJ even considered not appealing the decision but downplayed the defenses. Id.
The case eventually was decided by the Supreme Court in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union. 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (striking down the particular sections of the telecommunications
act).
99
Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 510. If the DOJ had the obligation to always
make the best argument before the Supreme Court, regardless of the President’s opinion or
whether the act originated in another branch, Congress and the DOJ bureaucracies would
benefit. Id. The latter would expand its authority and independence from the White House,
and the former would make sure that its interests are always being defended. Id.
92
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previous section, the possibility of voicing Congress’ concerns via an amicus brief
does not have the same strength in the constitutional adjudicative process as using
the institutional relationship and prestige built by the DOJ with the Court. Repeat
players have advantages over the one-time shooter. 100 Under Whittington’s
political reading of constitutional adjudication, one could argue that the authority
of US judicial supremacy has not been exclusively a consequence of doctrinal
formalistic interpretations; but it rather exists because other political actors have
had reasons of their own to recognize it.101
B. Adjudication as an Instrument of Political Coalitions
The constitutional interplay between executive and judicial powers in the
United States is not unique in the world. According to comparative studies, the
general trend in constitutional democracies is for the highest courts to become
politically consequential institutions. 102 Beyond resolving disputes or enforcing
laws, they are playing an expanded role in governance.103 By judicial role I make
reference here to the functions they play in politics, governance, and society.104
Martin Shapiro, for example, identifies at least four sociopolitical roles that high
courts play in governance: 105 (1) they resolve disputes, which translates into
maintaining order; (2) they legitimize government law and policies, and control
local authorities, police, and bureaucrats; (3) they can legitimize the existing
systems of economic power by enforcing contractual rules, property rights, and in
some cases protect monopolies (of state companies, unions, etc.); and (4) through
interpretation they become lawmakers.106
All of these sociopolitical roles share a common element: high courts can
act as agents of dominant political coalitions. 107 By enacting legislation and
amending constitutions, these coalitions create a set of constitutional
understandings of how to distribute power among themselves. 108 Such
constitutional understandings are not static. The US examples described above and
the studies by comparative constitutional law scholars show that judges can slightly
modify the political leaders’ agenda through legal interpretation when pushed to do
100

Galanter, supra note 11.
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 26, 285.
102
See generally CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11.
103
Id. at 6. The term “role” used in this context is not intended to be a reference to
judicial roles in connection to the way judges reason in particular cases. In jurisprudential
terms judges can have a legalistic/formalistic role (adhere to the text and precedents); an
activist role (prioritizing flexibility and substantive justice); or a deferential role (to the
democratically elected powers or specialized agencies).
104
Id. at 3.
105
SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 16.
106
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 3–4.
107
Id. at 4; HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY, supra note 16.
108
HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY, supra note 16, at 3.
101
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so by new political coalitions or social pressures. 109 Examples of the influence
judges can have on political coalitions’ constitutional understandings are their
faculty of defining the powers of each branch of government; breaking deadlocks,
and forcing bureaucracies to comply with statutory or constitutional law.
This does not mean that judges will always align with the reconstructive
agenda proposed by an incoming coalition. In many cases, judges were nominated
by the preexisting political regime.110 Moreover, judicial changes are limited by a
set of characteristics of the legal process: (1) the legal culture of the state, the
constitutional texts, and precedents control part of their reasoning, and departing
from them is not an easy task;111 (2) judges also have a set of preconceptions guided
by their own political, professional and philosophical commitments; 112 and (3)
assertive courts are conscious of the political and social backlash to their
decisions.113
Then why would the legal process be an adequate avenue to try to change
a preexisting constitutional understanding? Law, as opposed to politics, has certain
characteristics that insulate the judiciary from fully defending the existing regime’s
understandings. 114 For instance, judges have to work with statutory and
precedential bases of discretion. They “cannot readily afford to ignore the long-term
109

HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY, supra note 16, at 3; TOM GINSBURG & TAMIR
MOUSTAFA, RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 207–34
(2008); Tom Ginsburg et al., Judicial Review in New Democracies: Constitutional Courts in
Asian Cases, 3 NAT'L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 143 (2008); CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note
11, at 4 (“Traditionally, courts are expected to faithfully enforce the laws, not make or change
them, for in principle law is to be made by political leaders, embodying those leader’s policy
preferences. However, as both established and newer democracies have empowered courts
to declare laws and executive orders unconstitutional, there has been a marked increase in
courts’ potential to assume new roles—to make new law and apply law in new ways. When
courts play these new roles in ways that depart from political leaders’ preferences, they can
exert a significant, independent, and distinctively judicial influence on broad realms of public
policy, redistributing political authority.”).
110
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 5; WHITTINGTON, supra note 11.
111
DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (1997); Alexandra Huneeus et
al., Cultures of Legality: Judicialization and Political Activism in Contemporary Latin
America, CULTURES OF LEGALITY: JUDICIALIZATION AND POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN
CONTEMPORARY LATIN AMERICA 3, 3–25 (2013) [hereinafter Huneeus, Cultures of Legality];
Alexandra Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience: The Chilean Judiciary’s Human
Rights Turn, 35 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 99, 99 (2010) [hereinafter Huneeus, Judging from a
Guilty Conscience].
112
Lisa Hilbink, The Origins of Positive Judicial Independence, 64 WORLD POL. 587,
587 (2012); Duncan Kennedy, Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 RESEARCH
L. & SOC. 3 (1980) [hereinafter Kennedy, Towards an Historical Understanding of Legal
Consciousness]; Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–
2000, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19 (2006).
113
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 5; ALEC STONE SWEET, THE JUDICIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF EUROPE (2004).
114
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 167.
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and wide-ranging implications of its decisions affecting the current occupant of a
government office.”115 Hence, even if they are part of the dominant constitutional
understanding that the incoming President opposes, they know that setting
precedent that widely restricts the exercise of power could eventually backfire once
the dominant coalition regains the control of the administration.116
A number of commentators on judicial politics have identified that in new
or restored democracies the “winds” that force courts to become politically
consequential institutions are stronger than in well-settled democracies.117 Pressure
is placed on the highest courts to define the abidingness to the laws and
constitutional understandings of the replaced political regimes. Moreover, the
institutions and legislation that provide immunities to former members of the
coalitions are questioned in court. Accordingly, “judges face a choice between
ruling for regime stalwarts or challengers, between strengthening or weakening
aspirations for constitutional democracy, and between entrenching the interest and
values for incumbent or of new majorities.”118 In the eyes of the incoming political
coalitions, judges become bystanders too or perpetrators of the crimes committed
by the previous regime.119 In the same vein, judges can be used to advance legal or
policy incentives that the political coalitions find difficult to impose on their own
either due to the preexisting constitutional constrains or to lack of political
capital.120 Yet, the winds might not be enough to persuade the court to modify the
preexisting constitutional understandings. 121
According to Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein, and Robert A.
Kagan, the national institutional and political structures such as the constitutional
design or the scope of judicial institutions have to be in place to allow the change.122
Moreover, the self-perception or legal consciousness of the judiciary matters in
terms of the incentives and individual motives to adopt a new constitutional

115

WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 169.
Id. at 168.
117
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 21 (“[A change in role] is determined
by multiple and interacting opportunities and risks, generated by structural factors and shortterm political currents and winds, and ultimately on the skill and capacity of the judges who
confront these challenges and embrace (or ignore) these opportunities.”).
118
Id. at 8.
119
Huneeus, Cultures of Legality, supra note 111, at 10.
120
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 14 (“Political scientists often point out
that constitutional decisions in which high courts ‘make policy’ are not necessarily or even
usually countermajoritarian. Judges take legal or policy initiatives that political leaders
support but find difficult to launch on their own owing to constitutional restrictions or
political constraints”); Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative
Deference to the Judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35 (1993). See generally GORDON
SILVERSTEIN, LAW’S ALLURE: HOW LAW SHAPES, CONSTRAINS, SAVES, AND KILLS POLITICS
(2009).
121
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 19–20.
122
Id.
116
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understanding. 123 In the same vein, the internal struggle among the members of the
highest courts might impede the institution from adopting them.124 In states that
adopt democracy for the first time or that restore democracy after an authoritarian
regime, it is not enough that the political forces in the face of divided government
invite the courts to restructure the constitutional understandings; all of the above
mentioned factors can resist such an effort.
In the case of Latin America, after the fall of the authoritarian regimes in
the late 1980s and early 1990s, the region experienced several episodes where the
incoming presidency faced opposition from the previous political coalition. Former
coalitions might maintain control over the bureaucracies, the judiciaries, or
congress.125 Transitions to democracy do not imply that the pre-existing regime
disappears fully. In many cases key government players were confirmed by the
previous political coalitions. In fact, in a region where most of the governments of
the transitions reached power opposing the excesses of presidentialism and the
control of the executive power of courts and congress, the traditional instruments to
stir preexisting institutions are difficult to employ.126 For example, an incoming
president who tries to force the highest court, through appointment procedures or
through budget constraints, to adopt an expansion of presidential powers can be
politically attacked for using the same instruments that the overthrown military
junta or semi-dictator president used in the past.
Note the paradox that Latin America represents for our comparative
analysis. Both the US and the Latin American experience show scenarios of
fragmented governments, with institutions that respect the preexisting
constitutional understandings. However, in the United States, the president can
borrow the powers of the Supreme Court in order to advance his agenda. This
benefits the Supreme Court because it reaffirms its judicial supremacy, and benefits
the executive because it gives the expansion of presidential powers a judicial
legitimacy. As we will see in the next sections, in the case of Latin America, many
of the highest courts have resisted the winds of change. Due to the historical and
political context of the region, it has become difficult for the incoming president to
convince the highest courts to modify the preexisting regime. Yet, in the case of
Latin America there is still one open avenue that the president could take. The next
sections will show how the proceedings before the IACtHR can become an
instrument to achieve the same reconstructive goal without having to bear the
political costs of being accused of expanding presidential powers.127

123

CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 21; Kennedy, Towards an Historical
Understanding of Legal Consciousness, supra note 112, at 10; Abram Chayes, The Role of
the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281 (1976); Abram Chayes, Public
Law Litigation and the Burger Court, 96 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1982).
124
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 21.
125
Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience, supra note 111.
126
GARGARELLA, supra note 22.
127
Id. (explaining how even with the constitutional reforms that empowered the
judiciary and that constitutionalized human rights treaties, hyper-presidentialism is still
present in the region).
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IV. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM
This section examines how Latin America executive powers use the InterAmerican System of Human Rights’ litigation process to bypass local judiciaries
and legislative bodies. In a way, Latin American presidents confronting cases
before the IACtHR regarding acts of previous governments or of other powers face
choices similar to those faced by the US executive when determining the
government’s position for the Supreme Court.
I begin this section’s inquiry by highlighting that presidents in this region
have a monopoly over the defense of their states before international tribunals.
Most Latin American countries are presidential or semi-presidential systems of
government that maintained the US constitutional formula of giving full control of
foreign affairs to the executive branch.128 The common practice in litigation before
the IACtHR is for the state to appoint the sitting ambassador in Costa Rica as the
initial agent of the government.129 As the case progresses, states usually appoint an
128

GARGARELLA, supra note 22.
Although the rules of procedure of the Court do not specify that the Agent of the
State must be from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or another executive branch official, the
common practice has been to nominate as an Agent of State someone from the executive
power or a special counsel designated by the Executive power. See e.g., The Last Temptation
of Christ Merits, supra note 26, ¶ 23 (“On May 27, 1999, the State appointed Edmundo
Vargas Carreño, Chilean Ambassador to Costa Rica, as its agent and indicated that it would
receive notifications at the Chilean Embassy in Costa Rica”); Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico,
Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 209, ¶ 6 & n.5
(Nov. 23, 2009) (“The following appeared at this hearing . . . . for the State: Fernando GómezMont, Secretary of the Interior of Mexico; Daniel Francisco Cabeza de Vaca Hernández,
Sub-secretary of Legal Issues and Human Rights of the Secretariat of the Interior; Juan
Manuel Gómez-Robledo Verduzco, Sub-secretary of Multilateral Issues and Human Rights
of the Foreign Affairs Secretariat; José Luis Chávez García, Attorney General of Military
Justice of the National Defense Secretariat; Pablo Ojeda; Coordinator of Advisors of the
Secretary of the Interior; María Carmen Oñate Muñoz, Ambassador of the Mexican Embassy
in Costa Rica, Secretariat of Foreign Affairs; Alejandro Negrín Muñoz, General Human
Rights and Democracy Director of the Secretariat of Foreign Affairs; Jaime Antonio López
Portillo Robles Gil, Human Rights Director of the National Defense Secretariat; Ricardo
Trejo Serrano, General Director of Criminal Procedures of the Attorney General of the
Republic; Guillermo Leopoldo Mendoza Argüello, Representative of the 5th Section of the
General Staff of the National Defense Secretariat; Francisca Méndez Escobar, Head of the
State Department and In Charge of Economic, Political, Legal, and Press issues, Mexican
Embassy in Costa Rica, and José Ignacio Martín del Campo, Case Director of the Secretariat
of Foreign Affairs”); Atala Riffo & Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 6 & n.9 (Feb. 24, 2012) (“The State
appointed Mr. Miguel Angel Gonzalez [Ambassador of Chile in Costa Rica] and Ms. Paulina
Gonzalez Vergara [Undersecretary at the Ministry of Justice of Chile] as Agents); La Cantuta
v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶¶
19, 32 (Nov. 29, 2006) (“On September 29, 2006, during its LXXII Regular Session, the
Court held the public hearing which had been summoned (supra para. 23), and at which there
129

To Speak with One Voice

581

additional agent or advisor from the ministry of foreign affairs.130 The envoy might
be another member of the foreign service who specializes in international litigation,
a special advisor of the ministry of foreign affairs, or the attorney general office.131
At the end the control of the defense is on the hand of governmental entities that are
part of the executive branch.132
All communications between the state and the Court are channeled through
and conducted by the ministry of foreign affairs of the state and its embassy in Costa
Rica. Considering this fact, my working hypothesis is that when the case deals with
acts of other authorities or previous governments, such as judicial decisions or
legislation passed by congress, the executive can decide if it is in its interest to allow
other governmental actors to participate in the proceedings. There is no procedural
mechanism in which the court could directly communicate its decisions, hear the
testimony, or receive arguments from other government actors not recognized by
the agents of the state in the case. This was particularly clear in the cases of Artavia
v. Costa Rica,133 and the Last Temptation of Christ v. Chile.134
From this perspective, perhaps one of the most important differences
between the US national and the international adjudicatory system is that in the
former Congress and federal agencies could still voice their concerns in the
proceeding through an amicus brief or private litigants could present arguments that
favor the underrepresented branch. 135 In the international system, other branches
of government without the consent of the central government cannot present briefs
and victims do not frame their claims as a separation of power issue, but rather as
violations of the state as a unit. 136 In the majority of the cases, it is the sole
appeared . . . for the State: Ivan Arturo Bazar-Chacon [Deputy Attorney General for
Supranational Affairs of the Ministry of Justice of Peru], Agent, and Alberto Gutierrez-La
Madrid, Ambassador of Peru in Costa Rica”); Artavia Murillo et al. (“In vitro fertilization”)
v. Costa Rica, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
257, ¶ 8 (Nov. 28, 2012) (“The State appointed Ana Lorena Brenes Esquivel, Attorney
general, as its Agent and Magda Ines Rojas Chaves, Depute Attorney General, as co-agent”)
[hereinafter Artavia Merits]; Fontevecchia and D`Amico v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 238, ¶ 4 & n.6 (Nov. 29, 2011) (only
available in Spanish).
130
Supra note 129.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
See infra Section V.D.
134
See infra Section V.C.
135
Waxman, supra note 13, at 1085 (discussing the power of agencies and Congress
to present amicus briefs in the US context); Bell, supra note 13, at 1060; Lochner, supra note
13, at 551; Devins & Prakash, supra note 13, at 571–72; Devins, Political Will and the
Unitary Executive, supra note 13; Devins, Unitariness and Independence, supra note 13;
Devins & Herz, The Uneasy Case for Department of Justice Control of Federal Litigation,
supra note 13, at 579; Devins & Herz, The Battle That Never Was, supra note 13; Frost,
supra note 13, at 914; Grove & Devins, supra note 13.; Myers, 272 U.S. at 52; Chadha, 462
U.S. at 919; Windsor, 833 F. Supp. 2d at 394.
136
This follows from the same logic of Article 7 of the Vienna Convention, which
only recognizes delegates as representing the State when they are the Heath of State, Heads
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prerogative of the executive to determine the legal position of the state, regardless
of the fact that the violation might have originated in an act of the legislative body,
a decision of the judiciary, or policies of local authorities. It is not unusual to find
declarations of the representatives of the state in the proceedings in which they
concede that a judicial decision or a law passed by Congress is in fact a violation of
an international human rights treaty, and then invite the Court to move to the
remedies stages.137 My contention is that these acceptances are not necessarily out
of a human rights commitment; rather, they are motivated by the executive benefits
of imposing a policy he could not have imposed at the domestic level due to political
or legal constraints. This is consistent with statistics presented by Professor
Alexandra Huneeus, which show how executive powers in Latin America have been
more willing to comply with the decisions of the IACtHR than the domestic
legislative or judicial powers.138
In at least five cases reviewed in the next Section, local executives at the
time of the defense of the case agreed with the agenda pushed by the supranational
court and allowed it to be intrusive.139 A Court’s expansion gave the executive the
pretext to impose an agenda that domestically could have been harder to achieve
with political parties or social opposition. Moreover, the cases are an example of
the evolution of the Court into a more politically consequential court at the domestic
level through its reasoning: the Caracazo v. Venezuela case took place in the early
stages of the expansive moment of the Court;140 the Last Temptation of Christ v.
Chile case was one of the first cases in which the Court ordered a State to modify
its constitution on issues not related to amnesties;141 and the Artavia v. Costa Rica
case offers the opportunity to review the latest effort of the Court to make its
remedies more expansive at the domestic level and to modify the way domestic
constitutional courts reason about rights.142
Before moving to the concrete cases, the following subsections are
intended to describe how the IACtHR has evolved from a judicial mechanism to
of Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs—all of them traditionally corresponding to
the executive branch. They can be considered as representing the state in question only if
these authorities give appropriate full powers to other branches of government. Vienna
Convention, supra note 1, Art. 1. Amicus briefs in the system are allowed in certain judicial
procedures, but they have not been used by branches of government. They have mostly been
presented by academic institutions individuals or NGOs.
137
See infra Sections V.B, V.C, V.D.
138
Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons from the Inter-American
Court’s Struggle to Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 493, 508–09 (2011).
139
See infra Sections V.B, V.C, V.D. Other cases not covered within where the Court
was over intrusive in its orders are Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83 (Sept. 3, 2001); Almonacid Arellano et al. v.
Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept.
26, 2006). See also Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 54 (critiquing the Court’s over expansive
remedies jurisprudence).
140
See infra Section V.B.
141
See infra Section V.C.
142
See infra Section V.D.
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avoid diplomatic intervention from Western powers in the region to a court that
analogizes its role to the powers of a constitutional court. The IACtHR has become
politically consequential at the domestic level.143 Subsection A describes the bases
of its operation and its connection with the American Convention on Human Rights.
Subsection B then analyzes the transformation of the Court into an international
body that reasons as a supranational constitutional court. Subsection B focuses on
the political context that motivated the change. At the end of the Section, the reader
will be able to identify clearly how the Court depicts its functions and the type of
jurisprudence that it has created in order to support its constitutional role.
A. Intro to the Operation of the IACtHR
1. The Origins: Sovereignty First.
The idea of creating an Inter-American Court is older than the 1969
American Convention of Human Rights (the “Convention”), and it even predates
the creation of the European Court of Human Rights.144 Contrary to what some
commentators assume, Latin American countries were the first regional block to
propose in 1945 a system where individuals could bring claims against states for
rights violations.145 The origins of the institution also show a stark contrast with
143

Dulitzky, supra note 8; Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, Co-Existence and CoOrdination of Mechanisms of International Protection of Human Rights, in 202 COLLECTED
COURSES OF THE HAGUE ACAD. OF INT'L L. 9, 93, 99 (1987); Sergio García Ramírez, La
Jurisprudencia de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos humanos en Materia de
Reparaciones, in LA CORTE INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS. UN CUARTO DE
SIGLO: 1970-2004 1, 4 (2005) (arguing that human rights treaties should be interpreted as
living texts, and constitutions are to be interpreted in an evolutionary way; “[the IACtHR]
fulfills an analogous role as the one from the constitutional and supreme courts under their
own competences, this role is to fix, according to an inexorably progressive criteria—that
systematically re-interprets, with a contemporary view, the texts written in the past, under
different circumstances—the meaning of the supreme formulas of domestic law. This reinterpretation of the text through progressive constructions is necessary in light of the need
for these formulas to lead, in each new condition, the life of the nation.”).
144
G.L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L L. 101, 102 (2008). Most commentators reviewing the
IACtHR begin with the American Convention and how the ECtHR model influenced Latin
America. Id. (“The Court corresponds to the European Court of Human Rights within the
regional system of the Council of Europe. Indeed, the drafters of the ACHR substantially
modeled the Court and its relationship with the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights on the structure of the European human rights system as it existed in the 1960s.”).
145
Kathryn Sikkink, Latin American Countries as Norms Protagonists of the Idea of
International Human Rights, 20 GLOB. GOV. 389, 390–91 (2014) (arguing that “Latin
American countries were protagonists of the idea of ‘international human rights’; that is, the
idea that there should be international involvement in formulating and enforcing international
human rights norms and law, and the related idea that there should be international
involvement in democracy promotion.”). See also Mary Ann Glendon, The Forgotten
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the narrative presented by the advocates of international human rights regimes that
see in them a supranational judicial system that helps pierce state sovereignty.146 In
fact, the system was designed to preserve the sovereign rights of the Latin American
states.147
The first time Latin American governments proposed such a mechanism,
it was not considered as a way to give up sovereignty, but rather a way to reinforce
it by precluding foreign military interventions.148 According to Tom J. Farer, at the
end of World War II Latin American countries were very sensitive to potential
interventions based on the diplomatic protection of US citizens abroad. 149 The
decision to promote the creation of the Inter-American institutions was a way to
constrain expanding power of the North Americans. 150 In other words,
“[c]ontainment was their dominating purpose” and the Organization of American
States (OAS) institutions “were its imperfect expressions.”151

Crucible: The Latin American Influence on the Universal Human Rights Idea, 16 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 27, 27 (2003); HUDSON, supra note 2, at 169–80, 252–53.
146
Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced, 74 IND.
L. J. 1397 (1998); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 240, 241 (2000); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal
States, 6 EUR. J. INT'L L. 538, 538; José E. Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A
Critique of Slaughter’s Liberal Theory, 12 EUR. J. INT'L L. 183 (2001).
147
SAMUEL MOYN, THE LAST UTOPIA: HUMAN RIGHTS IN HISTORY 176–211 (2010)
(identifying how non-intervention, sovereignty, and self-determination were all components
of the early years of the human rights movement).
148
This is clear from the reading of Resolution XL of the Act of the Inter-American
Conference on Problems of War and Peace of 1945, which instructed the Inter-American
Judicial Committee to present a draft Declaration that would ensure that the “international
protection of the essential rights of man would eliminate the misuse of diplomatic protection
of citizens abroad, the exercise of which has more than once led to the violation of the
principles of non-intervention and of equality between nationals and aliens.” Pan-American
Union, Inter-American Juridical Committee “Draft Declaration of the International Rights
and Duties of Man and Accompanying Report” 40 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 93, 114–15 (1946). This
was consistent also with the whole Inter-American System that was planned partly with the
new expansion of the American hegemony after WWII in mind. On the one hand, the Latin
American States wanted to curtail the expansion of the American influence, but the United
States also wanted to maintain the Latin Americans in line to avoid the soviet influence. Tom
J. Farer, The Changing Context of the Inter-American Relations, FUTURE INTER-AM. SYST.
xv, xvii (1979) [hereinafter Farer, The Changing Context of the Inter-American Relations];
TOM J. FARER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM: ARE THERE
FUNCTIONS FOR THE FORMS? 4 (1978) [hereinafter FARER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM]; Richard J. Bloomfield, Inter-American System: Does It Have a
Future, FUTURE INTER-AM. SYST. 1, 6 (1979).
149
FARER, THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 148, at
4–5.
150
Id.
151
Farer, The Changing Context of the Inter-American Relations, supra note 148, at
xvii.
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The envisioned formula of the Latin American delegations was to
establish, in an international declaration, a set of rights that would fix a minimum
standard of justice across the region.152 By doing so, the Latin American states that
had suffered Western interventions under the pretext of diplomatic protection would
dissuade foreigners from arguing that they were not being given a minimum
standard of protection. 153 The Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on
Problems of War and Peace of 1945 included a declaration inviting the Council of
Inter-American Jurists to draft an American declaration of universal rights and a
statute for a Latin American Court of Justice that would have jurisdiction only for
cases in which foreign nationals were involved. 154
A year later, in 1946, the Inter-American Judicial Committee presented a
Draft Declaration of the International Rights and Duties of Man.155 Draft Article
XXI of the American Declaration reflected the preoccupation with the abuse of
diplomatic protection and the intention to contain it through the creation of an
international court:
In the case of aliens alleging violation of the foregoing
fundamental rights by the state in which they are resident, the
compliant shall be decided first by the courts of the state itself;
and in cases in which a denial of justice is alleged by the state of
which the alien is national, the case, failing diplomatic settlement,
shall be submitted to an International Court, the statute of which
shall be included as an integral part of the instrument in which the
present Declaration is to be adopted.156

152

According to the reports of the 1945 Conference on Problems of War and Peace,
“A special feature of the Mexican project was the suggestion that the Declaration, ‘by
establishing a minimum standard of civilized justice’, might do away with the necessity of
the diplomatic protection of citizens abroad which had led frequently to the violation of the
principle of nonintervention. To this end the project recommended the creation of an InterAmerican organ which would have the special duty of watching over the regulation and
practical application of the principles which were to be proclaimed in the declaration.” PanAmerican Union, Inter-American Juridical Committee “Draft Declaration of the
International Rights and Duties of Man and Accompanying Report” 40 AM. J. OF INT’L L.
93, 104 (1946)
153
Id.
154
Id. at 114–15 (1946) (containing Resolution XL adopted by the States in the Final
Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace of 1945 included the
Mexican proposal and stated that the “[i]nternational protection of essential rights of man
would eliminate the misuse of diplomatic protection of citizens abroad, the exercise of which
has more than once led to the violation of principles of non-intervention and of equality
between nations and aliens, with respect to the essential rights of man.”).
155
Id. at 110 (discussing the administration of an international standard of
fundamental rights).
156
Id. at 99.
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In 1948, the American nations met again, this time for the Ninth
Conference in Bogota, Colombia, and adopted the OAS Charter and the American
Declaration on Human Rights. According to the reports of the Convention, the
delegations were divided into three postures regarding the effectiveness that the
Declaration should have. 157 The delegates discussed heavily whether the
Declaration should have been a traditional treaty with concrete obligations or a
general abstract declaration, whether the protection of the rights should have been
left to state authorities recognized by domestic constitutions or by an international
judicial body, and whether it should have a legal guarantee to make its provisions
enforceable.158
A year after the Bogota Conference and the adoption of the American
Declaration of Human Rights, the Inter-American Juridical Committee met in Rio
de Janeiro to study a draft statute of the Inter-American Court.159 It first recognized
the dual intention of the American Declaration to become an instrument for
avoiding diplomatic interventions and for recognizing the international protection
of a set of shared rights by all American States. 160 The Committee then was
compelled to recognize that the American Declaration “did not create a legal
contractual obligation.”161 Yet, according to the Committee, it served as a “well
defined guide” towards the aspiration of having an international protection of those
fundamental rights.162 Under the Committee’s views, for the system to become
effective, Latin American states needed to “radically transform their constitutional
systems.” 163 According to the Committee, the domestic constitutional systems
would need to “adapt” to the new international jurisdiction so that the domestic and
the international courts could operate in coordination, because they would “share”
the function of protecting the same rights.164
In 1948, the year when the Bogota Conference adopted the American
Declaration, only two Latin American States had fallen victims of dictatorships: the
Dominican Republic with General Trujillo and Honduras with Tiburcio Carias

157

Documento CB-445/C.VI-36 de la Comisión Sexta, Novena Conferencia
International Americana, Informe del Relator de la Comision Sexta, at 512 (1948)
[hereinafter Informe Relator Novena Conferencia].
158
Id. See also, Documento CB-147/C.VI-Sub A-4 de la Comisión Sexta, Novena
Conferencia International Americana, Minuta de la Primera Sesion de la Subcomision A, at
613 (1948).
159
Inter-American Juridical Committee "Informe Al Consejo Interamericano de
Jurisconsultos Sobre La Resolucion XXXI de La Conferencia de Bogota" (Recomendaciones
e Informes. Documentos Oficiales. 1949–1953, 1955) 105 [hereinafter Inter-American
Juridical Committee].
160
Id. at 106.
161
Id. at 107.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 109.
164
Inter-American Juridical Committee, supra note 159, at 109.
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Andino.165 The political landscape began to change in the 1950s. In 1959, when
the ministers of foreign affairs met for an extraordinary session of the OAS, Fidel
Castro had overthrown President Batista in Cuba;166 in 1954, General Stroessner
had taken power by military force in Paraguay;167 General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla
had successfully orchestrated a coup d’état in Colombia against President Laureano
Gómez Castro; 168 Anastasio Somoza Garcia had ruled Nicaragua under his grip
from 1936 until his assassination in 1956;169 Argentina suffered a military coup in
1955 to overthrow President Juan Domingo Peron;170 and in 1954, with the help of
the US Carlos Castillo Armas in Guatemala, they orchestrated a military coup and
ruled until his assassination three years later.171 These events dramatically changed
the tone and issues discussed in the OAS. Suddenly the most significant regional
problem was the preservation of democracy and its connection with human rights
treaties and the right of non-intervention by neighboring military States.
2. The 1969 Structure for a New Political Context: The Rise of Military
Coups
As stated above, the rise of military dictators in the 1950s and 1960s
changed Inter-American politics. The incident that marked the future of the InterAmerican system and triggered a desire to create regional mechanisms that would
ensure that states would not intervene in the affairs of their neighbors was the rise
of General Trujillo in the Dominican Republic.172 This time the fear was not only
of US intervention but also of dictators with nationalistic views that would try to
disrupt democratically elected government in order to expand their presence in the
region.173
165

Frank Moya Pons, The Dominican Republic since 1930, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF
LATIN AMERICA 509, 509 (1990); Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Honduras since 1930, 7
CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 283, 289–311 (1990).
166
Louis A. Perez, Cuba, c. 1930–59, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 419,
452–55 (1990); Jorge Dominguez, Cuba since 1959, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN
AMERICA 457, 457 (Leslie Bethell ed., 1990).
167
Paul H. Lewis, Paraguay Sine 1930, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA
233, 252–66 (1991).
168
Christopher Abel & Palacio Marco, Columbia, 1930–58, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF LATIN AMERICA 587, 616–27 (1991).
169
Victor Bulmer-Thomas, Nicaragua since 1930, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN
AMERICA 317, 333–44 (1990).
170
Juan Carlos Torre & Liliana de Riz, Argentina since 1946, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY
OF LATIN AMERICA 73, 92 (1991).
171
James Dunkerley, Guatemala since 1930, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN
AMERICA 221, 228–30 (1990).
172
Moya Pons, supra note 165, at 509.
173
KLAAS DYKMANN, PHILANTHROPIC ENDEAVORS OR THE EXPLOITATION OF AN
IDEAL?: THE HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES IN LATIN
AMERICA (1970–1991) 53–55 (2004).
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The incident that triggered the fear of intervention was the sponsored
assassination attempt by General Trujillo of the Venezuelan President Romulo
Betancourt in 1960.174 By the late 1950s, General Trujillo established a regime of
oppression in the Dominican Republic. As a way to control domestic opposition,
Trujillo shifted national attention to the neighboring governments, especially to
Venezuela, and associated them with the domestic dissenters.175 President Romulo
Betancourt was an outspoken opponent of Trujillo and its oppressive regime.176
After the failed assassination attempt, Betancourt raised the issue at the OAS.177
The Latin American states of the time believed that the expansion of dictators in the
region could become a threat to the sovereignty of democratically elected
governments and proposed to continue with the original project to create an InterAmerican Court.178
In addition to the Court, the states created another body to spread the ideals
of the American Declaration of Human Rights: an Inter-American Commission of
Human Rights. 179 This body was originally not authorized to examine specific
cases but rather, had the task of spreading information and promote the 1948
American Declaration of Human Rights. 180 This included on-site visit to the
members of the OAS to promote the ideals of the Declaration.181 As more people
would be acquainted with the Declaration’s content, it was believed that pressure
would prevent dictators from emerging and disseminating fear against the
neighboring states. As expected, the Commission’s first on-site visit was in 1961 to
the Dominican Republic. 182 The Commission’s visit was such a success in
reporting the situation in Trujillo’s Dominican Republic, that in 1965 it was
expressly authorized to examine complaints or petitions regarding specific cases.183
Notwithstanding these advancements, in the late 1960s military coups d’état kept
expanding in the region: Argentina suffered them in 1962, 1966, and 1976; 184 Peru
also followed the same path with the military regime of Juan Velasco Alvarado
from 1968 to 1975; 185 and Brazil suffered a coup in 1964 against president Joao
Giulart that would impose a military rule until 1985.186
In this political context, the American Convention on Human Rights was
adopted in 1969. This now binding treaty also gave life to the contemporary
174

DYKMANN, supra note 173, at 53–55.
Id.
176
Id. at 54–55.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 53–55.
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DYKMANN, supra note 173, at 55–57.
180
Id. at 57–59.
181
Id. at 57–58.
182
Id. at 59.
183
Id. at 59–61.
184
Torre & Riz, supra note 170, at 115–58.
185
Julio Cotler, Peru since 1960, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 451,
464–72 (1991).
186
Leslie Bethell & Celso Castro, Politics in Brazil under Military Rule, 1984-1985,
9 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA 165, 165–68 (2008).
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structure of the Inter-American System of Human Rights by establishing the
IACtHR. The Court began its regular operations in 1980 after the Convention
entered into force (1978) and its Statute was approved by the OAS General
Assembly (1979).187
According to the American Convention, the Court’s jurisdiction comprises
“all cases concerning the interpretation and application of the provisions of [the]
Convention that are submitted to it, provided that the States Parties to the case
recognize or have recognized such jurisdiction.” 188 In addition to disputes, the
member states may consult the Court regarding the interpretation of the Convention,
other human rights treaties, or the compatibility of domestic law with the
international covenant.189 In cases where a violation of the Convention has been
proven, the Court “shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his
rights or freedom that was violated.” 190 Moreover, it can rule that the
“consequences of the measure or situation that constituted the breach of such right
or freedom be remedied and that fair compensation be paid to the injured” if
appropriate.191 As will be discussed more fully in Subsection III.B.2, this power
has been interpreted by the Court as including the possibility of ordering measures
that will ensure the non-repetition of the violation of the right in the future; not only
to the concrete victim in the case, but also, to other citizens of the state. This implies
that the Court can order structural remedies to state authorities.192 The judgment of
the Court is “final and not subject to appeal”193 and the parties according to the
Convention “undertake to comply with the judgment of the Court in any case to
which they are parties.” 194 The Convention is silent regarding whether the
jurisprudence abides for the states that did not participate in the concrete case.
In terms of structure, the Court is composed of seven Judges, all nationals
of the OAS member states, elected by an absolute majority of its General
Assembly.195 The judges serve for a term of six years, may be reelected once, and
are partially renewed every three years.196 The Court requires a quorum of five
judges for its deliberations, and only meets an average of four times a year in San
Jose, Costa Rica for its regular sessions and twice a year for special sessions in

187

Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, art. 33,
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The Court did not begin its operation
until 1980 and did not adopt its Rules of Operation until August 1980. See Antônio Augusto
Cançado Trindade, The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, INTERAMERICAN SYSTEM OF HUMAN RIGHTS 133 (1998).
188
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187, art. 62, at 159.
189
Id.
190
Id. art. 63, at 159.
191
Id.
192
Antkowiak, supra note 9, at 355–57.
193
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187, art. 67, at 160.
194
Id. art. 68, at 160.
195
Id. arts. 52–53, at 157–58.
196
Id. art. 54, at 158.
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different jurisdictions.197 It is not a sitting body, and by holding hearings outside
the jurisdiction of the involved state, it is arguably highly insulated from the politics
and pressures of local actors.
Only the Inter-American Commission or the member states can bring cases
before the Court.198 In cases regarding human rights violations, the victims must
first exhaust domestic remedies and be heard by the Commission before the Court
obtains jurisdiction. 199 In this “pre-trial,” the Commission reviews the case,
requests information from the government of the state, ascertains the grounds of the
petition, hears oral statements, and helps the parties reach a friendly settlement.200
If a settlement is not reached or if the state refuses to cooperate, the Commission
assesses whether there are enough merits to bring the case before the Court.201
Using the analytical tools described in the previous sections—thinking of
the parties, the procedure and the strategies—the above mentioned structural and
procedural elements allow us to identify certain trends regarding actors and issues
involved in all the cases. The fact that the victims have to exhaust all available local
remedies before bringing the case to the Commission places judicial powers on the
“accused stand” regardless of the issue being discussed. Either the local judges
were unable to properly address the victim’s claims, or the judicial system with its
actions or omissions actively violated the rights of the accused. Judges become
bystanders or perpetrators in the majority of cases. Secondly, as stated above the
executive through its ministry of foreign affairs is always the coordinating authority
in the defense of the case. Regardless of where and how the violation occurred, the
executive branch decides the defense’s arguments, chooses which government
actors can participate in the proceedings, and decides if the state will offer
reparation to the victims. In every case, the judiciary and the executive are always
involved in one way or another. Hence, the focus in the next section is on how the
litigation of human rights cases in the region and the decisions of the IACtHR affect
domestic judicial-executive relations.

197
See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Session Dates, CORTE
INTERAMERICANA DE DERECHOS HUMANOS, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/courttoday/fechas-de-sesiones (last visited Sept. 9, 2017); American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 187, art. 56, at 158 (“Five judges shall constitute a quorum for the
transaction of business by the Court”).
198
American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 187, art. 61, at 159 (“Only
the State Parties and the Commission shall have the rights to submit a case to the Court.”).
199
Id. art. 46–48, at 156 (“[R]emedies under domestic law have been pursued and
exhausted . . . . The Commission shall consider . . .”).
200
Id. art. 48, at 156.
201
Id. art. 50, at 157.
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B. Becoming a Politically Consequential Court at the Domestic Level
1. The Influence of US Legal Liberalism in the New Constitutional
Landscape
The fall of authoritarian regimes in the 1990s changed the Latin American
domestic constitutional landscape. NGOs, practitioners, governments that
negotiated the transition, and academics fostered a change in the role played by
constitutional law and human rights treaties.202 The movement was characterized
by a particular view of constitutional law. Constitutions were to be regarded “as
embodying universal principles (human rights) deemed to be above statutory law
and susceptible to be directly applied by the judiciary, even at the cost of trumping
the sovereign decisions of the democratically elected branches of government.”203
Post-dictatorship-Latin-American constitutions reflected this vision. 204
They first promulgated additional powers to constitutional courts. 205 Secondly,
they included new social, economic, cultural and civil rights.206 Third, and hand in
hand with these two changes, they assigned human rights covenants an express
constitutional hierarchy—some countries even placed them above it.207
The reforms were targeted at strengthening domestic constitutional courts
vis-à-vis the excesses of authoritarianism, traditionally exercised through the abuses
of presidential power. 208 The region was, and to a certain extent is today, still
perceived as one where “the survival of the rule of law seems to be fundamentally
threatened by the constant attempts of the executive to expand its powers.”209 Given
the hyper-presidential nature of the political regimes in the region, the prescription
in the last decades has given the courts the ability “to say ‘no’ to the executive and
202

Huneeus., Cultures of Legality, supra note 111, at 4 (explaining how the shift of
ideas on the role of actors in the Latin American legal elite is key in understanding the
political changes of the region).
203
Couso, supra note 22, at 154 (“The works of scholars such as [Carlos] Nino,
[Carlos] Peña, and others introduced into Latin America what Alec Stone Sweet (2000) has
labeled ‘higher-law constitutionalism’; that is, a theory that regards the Constitution as
embodying universal principles (human rights) deemed to be above any statutory law and
susceptible to be directly applied by the judiciary, even at the cost of trumping the sovereign
decisions of the democratically elected branches of government. This approach, continues
Stones Sweet, amounts to a postmodern version of natural-law thinking.”).
204
See generally Rodrigo Uprimny, The Recent Transformation of Constitutional Law
in Latin America, Trends and Challenges, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1587 (2011).
205
Huneeus, Cultures of Legality, supra note 111, at 3.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
GARGARELLA, supra note 22, at 155–62; Roberto Gargarella, Recientes Reformas
Constitucionales en América Latina: Una Primera Aproximación, 36 DESARROLLO
ECONÓMICO 971, 971 (1997).
209
Siri Gloppen et al., The Accountability Function of the Courts in New
Democracies, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF
COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 1, 1 (2004).
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make it ‘stick.’”210 In line with this constitutional transformation the region saw an
effort from NGOs, the IACtHR, opposition parties and international agencies to
promote an independent judiciary.211 Judicial reform in Latin America has been
continuous since then, and in most jurisdictions, courts, including constitutional and
supreme courts, have achieved a formal level of independence. 212 Most Latin
American judiciaries now have judicial counsels that oversee the work of judges
and allow the pursuit of a judicial career without a political intervention. 213 In some
jurisdictions, such as Argentina, other branches of government have very little
authority over the courts, to the point that they are considered to be “dangerously
removed from the will of the people,” too detached from the real political and social
problems of the nation, and representative of an “explosive formula for new
democracies.”214
In addition to reforming the judiciary, Latin America has also faced a shift
of traditional doctrinal scholarship. 215 This has had an impact on the way the
judiciary and practitioners perceive the role of judges.216 According to Eduardo
Lopez Medina, the genealogy of a new orthodoxy of Latin American
constitutionalism can be found in the influence of US scholars such as Ronald
Dworkin, H.L. Hart, and John Ely, and from continental Europe Robert Alexy and
Luigi Ferrajoli. 217 Most US scholars can be identified as liberal legal thinkers of

210

Gloppen et al., supra note 209, at 2.
Cf. Trubek, supra note 23.
212
ELIN SKAAR, JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN LATIN AMERICA:
VIOLATIONS, POLITICS, AND PROSECUTION 3–4 (2011).
213
Cf. Patricio Navia & Julio Ríos-Figueroa, The Constitutional Adjudication Mosaic
of Latin America, 38 COMP. POL. STUD. 189, 205–09 (2005) (explaining . . . and showing that
there are natural variances among jurisdictions that employ this model, but most of them
share similar stages in the process enabling them to stop atrocities); Hector Fix-Fierro,
Judicial Reform in Mexico: What Next?, BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL
APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 240, 263–65 (2011).
214
Gloppen et al., supra note 209, at 4; Roberto Gargarella, In Search of Democratic
Justice-What Courts Should Not Do: Argentina, 1983-2002, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE
JUDICIARY: THE ACCOUNTABILITY FUNCTION OF COURTS IN NEW DEMOCRACIES 132, 1 (2004).
215
Couso, supra note 22, at 141 (“The focus on legal scholarship as a factor
contributing to the shape of the legal cultures of Latin America derives from the conviction
that it represents one of the most important sites for the configuration of an understanding of
the nature, sources, and the role of the law, as well as conceptions about the judiciary and
legal interpretation.”).
216
Id. at 144 (“Legal scholarship in civil law countries is not merely a heuristic tool
but—more importantly—a way of shaping the representation that legal actors maintain
concerning the very nature of the enterprise of law. This is typically implicit because—while
explaining the law of the country—jurists help to constitute a discourse about the very nature
of law and of the legal system. This discourse is then transmitted to judges, legal academics,
and litigants through the medium of legal education, which in civil law regimes makes an
intensive use of legal scholarship as a pedagogical tool.”).
217
Eduardo & Medina, supra note 23, at 124–25, 412–13; Miguel Carbonell, Luigi
Ferrajoli: Teórico del Derecho y de la Democracia, MIGUELCARBONELL.COM,
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the 1970s. 218 The US liberal academics developed scholarship that praised the
activism of the federal judiciary and particularly of the US Supreme Court during
the tenure of Chief Justice Earl Warren. 219 For the liberal US scholars, the
significance of the judiciary “was reinforced by the enhanced role judges were
starting to play in the broadening field of public-law litigation.”220 These views,
and particularly the role of the judge in public law adjudication, were key in laying
the foundation for the new movement of Latin American constitutionalism.221 In
Latin America, the judicial activism that US liberal scholars were trying to square
with US democratic values was interpreted as a benchmark of judicial work for
modern democracies.
These scholars’ presence had an important impact on the evolution of the
legal system because in Latin America doctrinal scholarship is a formal source of
law quoted as a basis for the decisions of the court.222 The new Latin American
progressive literature would argue, almost as an orthodoxy, that the new
constitutions should not be interpreted as a set of rules that should distribute powers
among political actors, but as:
being full of principles that could, and more often than not, be
used to limit or overcome the codified or legislated rules . . . . [I]t
was considered more adequate for the Court to give moral or
http://www.miguelcarbonell.com/docencia/sobre_Ferrajoli_printer.shtml; Esquirol, The
Fictions of Latin American Law (Part I), supra note 23, at 447.
218
David Kennedy, Ronald Dworkin, CANON AM. LEG. THOUGHT 552, 551–57 (2006)
[hereinafter Kennedy, Ronald Dworkin]; Trubek, supra note 23; David Kennedy, The “Rule
of Law,” Political Choice, and Development Common Sense, THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 95 (2006).
219
Kennedy, Ronald Dworkin, supra note 218, at 551.
220
Id.
221
Ronald Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1975); RONALD DWORKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 136 (1978); Eduardo & Medina, supra note 23, at 412–13; Couso,
supra note 22, at 165–66 (“A good indicator of the prevalence achieved in recent years by
the new constitutional orthodoxy is the sudden popularity within Latin America’s
constitutional academic community of three important global exponents of higher-law
constitutionalism: Ronald Dworkin (from the Anglo-American academic world); and Robert
Alexy and Luigi Ferrajoli (from the Continental European one). The interesting prominence
of these authors among Latin American constitutional scholars is that it suggests that a kind
of natural-law perspective is permeating the region.”). See generally RONALD DWORKIN,
LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
222
Couso, supra note 22, at 159–60 (“This is particularly the case in a region where
like other places with a civil law background - legal scholarship, or la doctrina, is considered
a formal source of law, and where it plays a critical role in socializing students into the legal
field. Not all scholarship on law carries this formal status; only scholarship that specifically
interprets and develops legal doctrine . . . . [C]onstitutional discourse experiences a
revolutionary transformation over the last few decades. I argue that this dramatic shift
facilitates the introduction of processes of judicialization of politics in the region by changing
traditional understandings of the status of legislated law and the role of courts in
democracy.”).
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political decisions a judiciable solution than to give predictability
and formalism to the decisions; it was better to reach substantive
results that were considered just and equitable than to focus on
procedural subtleties; ‘justice’ as a concept had a specific judicial
meaning and was more important than legality,223
The “conceptual revolution” was accompanied by a particular version of
constitutional law that promoted judicial activism, fostered the use of international
human rights instruments, and rejected formalism.224 According to Javier Couso,
“this paradigm shift owes much to the reception in Latin America of a global
doctrine affirming that human rights constitute the central category of
constitutionalism,” and that “inspiration came from the scores of Latin American
academics who started to pursue graduate training in law in the United States in the
late 1970s, where they were socialized by their liberal North American law
professors into the virtues of the legendary Warren Court.”225 An important source
of funding in the 1990s in favor of this constitutional orthodoxy came from USbased foundations that “built a powerful network that regularly published works
that combine constitutional theory and human rights with different aspects of the
public interest law agenda in Latin America.”226 The effort to embrace judicial
activism was accompanied with placing blame on traditional formalism for the
atrocities committed under the name of the law during the authoritarian regimes.227
223

Eduardo & Medina, supra note 23, at 412–13 (translation by author).
Couso, supra note 22, at 164–65.
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Id. at 166 (“Given this bleak diagnosis, proponents of this approach to legal action
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relevant to point out that the transformation of Latin America’s constitutional scholarship
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reform. See Fix-Fierro, supra note 213, at 231 (“It should be fairly evident from the previous
sections that judicial reform in Mexico is not primarily the result of foreign pressures or of
the intervention of international development agencies: neither has played a significant role
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In the words of Javier Couso, “the very formalism and judicial deference to
legislated law that characterized the previous paradigm was being blamed for the
passivity exhibited by the judiciaries in the face of the massive human rights
violations perpetrated during the authoritarian wave.”228
As will be analyzed in the next section, the work of the IACtHR during
this period of expansion also reflects this influence.229 To the IACtHR, judges, and
the advocates of judicial reform, if the region wanted to overcome the existing
social and political problems left after the fall of the dictators, domestic legal
systems needed judges that would reason the consequences and distributional
effects of the law.230 This view represents a paradox for our comparative analysis.
The experience in the US constitutional system of adjudication shows that executive
power can also benefit from the judicial expansion in public authority.231 It is not
necessarily true that courts will always control executives when they assert the
power of judicial supremacy. An “alliance” between the court and the executive
could emerge to jointly expand their powers.
2. The Period of Expansion
In the late 1990s, while domestic judiciaries were facing a process of
transformation, the IACtHR began to reconstruct its functions. It stopped
functioning as a Court that would work as a complementary system to the domestic
judicial institutions and began to operate as a supranational “constitutional”
court. 232 As opposed to a court limited to determining whether states violated
international law, it sees itself as a court empowered to define how domestic
authorities, including the highest courts, should exercise their constitutional
powers.233 This effort was reflected by several jurisprudential strategies. First, the
Court interpreted the Convention to include rights that were not expressly
contemplated in the text of the treaty.234 It then reinterpreted the remedies section
228
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Convention). See, e.g., Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶¶ 41–44 (Sept. 3, 2001) (the prohibition of amnesties
229
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of the Convention to include structural remedies and not only those involving the
particular victim.235 Moreover, the IACtHR expanded its interpretative powers by
modifying the rules of the Court to include the supervision of its own judgments;
further, it expanded its power to review cases that had happened before the entry
into force of the Convention.236
All of these jurisprudential moves reflect a concrete intention to abandon
its foundational logic of subsidiarity or auxiliary to domestic institutions, and adopt
a model in which the Court signals concrete responsibilities of particular
governmental actors, including domestic judiciaries.237 An element of this second
stage was the transformation of the traditional principles of interpretation of
international law to more expansive interpretations that included policy analysis and

for human rights violations); Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, §§ 105–29, 151–54 (Sept. 26, 2006)
(the prohibition of amnesties against internatnional crimes, the non-prescription of
international crimes, the prohibition on the use of the rule of non-retroactivity in criminal
cases, the prohibition on the use of the rule ne bis in idem in cases where new evidence has
been found after the judgment, and rights of the family victims to know the truth through a
judicial process); Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, §§ 116–17 (Sept. 18, 2003) (the non-perscription of human rights
violations); Alban Cornejo et al. v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 171,§ 111, (Nov. 22 2007) (the non-prescription of grave human
rights violations); La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, §§ 149226 (Nov. 29, 2006) (the prohibition on the use of the rule
of non-retroactivity in criminal cases and the prohibition on the use of the rule ne bis in idem
in cases where new evidence has been found after the judgment); Velasquez Rodriguez v.
Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, §
181 (July 29, 1988) (the right of the families of the victims to know the truth); Godinez Cruz
v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 5,
§191 (the right of the families of the victims to know the truth).
235
See, e.g., Salvador Herrera Carrasco, Las Reparaciones en la jurisprudencia de la
Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, 2 GRUPO LATINOAMERICANO DE ESTUDIOS
SOBRE DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL: SISTEMA INTERAMERICANO DE PROTECCIÓN DE LOS
DERECHOS HUMANOS Y DERECHO PENAL INTERNACIONAL TOMO 372 (2010), (“[I]t is
important to note that the rules on remedies that the Court could order have been created via
jurisprudence, because they cannot be found in any literal way in the text of the
Convention.”). The Convention never allowed expressly for such an expansive type of
remedies. It is the consensus of literature that they were created mainly through the
expansion of the IACtHR´s jurisprudence. Id.
236
See, e.g., Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154 (Sept. 26, 2006). The crimes had been
committed in 1973 and the amnesty laws had entered into force in 1978. Id. The American
Convention for Chile entered into force in 1990. The court argued that since the State had
not prosecuted the alleged criminals, the violations of the victims’ rights was present in the
time of the case; hence, it argued that it had jurisdiction since the crime was still being
committed against the family members. Id. §§ 42–50.
237
Neuman, supra note 9.
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consequentialist review. 238 The use of methods of interpretation that included
policy analysis and the consequences of the implementation of the law was the very
same type of reasoning that the constitutionalist movement of the 1990s was
pushing for at the domestic level.
An example of this type of reasoning is the Court’s construction of the
principle of “effectiveness” or effet utile.239 The Court has argued that it has the
238
Kennedy, The Hermeneutic of Suspicion in Contemporary American Legal
Thought, supra note 230, at 95–96 (“Doing teleological reasoning requires consideration of
the consequences of adoption of a particular interpretation of the ambiguous norm. One
should not choose a particular alternative unless applying it will serve its purpose in facts . .
. . This makes teleological interpretation dramatically different from induction/deduction, at
least in form, because the older method made a great point precisely of refusing the
consideration of either purposes or effects. [In ‘policy analysis’, ‘balancing’,
‘proportionality’] the gap or conflict or ambiguity in the system of norms is resolved by a
process of ‘weighting’, which can involve any and all types of legal values, concepts, norms
or instrumental purposes.”).
239
The original version of the effet utile principle was created to avoid absurd textual
interpretations in light of the treaty text. For example, in the words of the Chile v. Peru
tribunal of 1875 cited by these authorities, “the verb to charge has here no technical meaning
in the absence of other stipulations, and must be taken in its usual sense . . . . If the words
‘shall charge’ have not this meaning, they have none; and having none; there can be no
resulting effect. Hence, according to a recognized rule of interpretation, that signification
should be adopted which will permit the provision to operate [l´interpretation qui permit á
use stipulation du prouder ses effects].” Award of the Chile v. Peru Tribunal, April 7 1875,
as cited by G. Berlia, Contribution a l’Interpretation des Traites, RECUEIL DE COURS DE LA
ACADÉMIE DE DRIOT International, (1965), pp. 306. (The same meaning was given in another
case in the Permanent Court to Arbitration in 1910: “Because it is a principle of interpretation
that words in a document ought not to be considered as being without any meaning if there
is not specific evidence to that purpose and the interpretation referred to would lead to the
consequence . . . . It is an acknowledged rule of interpretation that treaty clauses must not
only be considered as a whole, but must also be interpreted so as to avoid as much as possible
depriving one of them of practical effect for the benefit of others.”). Award in the Affaire des
pecheries des cotes sptentrionales de L'atlantique. CPA, Septembre 7, 1910 as cited by G.
Berlia, Contribution a l’Interpretation des Traites, Rcuel de Cours, 1965, pp. 306. See also
Dionisio Anziloti, COURS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL,Vol. I, (Paris, 1929), p.112-13. The effet
utile principle was then connected to the Anglo-Saxon common law doctrine of implied
powers that favored an interpretation of a text that would give powers to a particular
institution to achieve its goals. Ludwik Ehrlich, L’Interpétation des Traités, RECUEIL DE
COURS DE LA ACADÉMIE DE DRIOT INTERNATIONAL, Vol. IV Tome 24, (1928) p. 84-5; Charles
de Vissicher, PROBLÈMES D’INTERPÉTATION JUDICIAIRE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC,
(Éditions A. Perdone Paris, 1963), 84-85. From these two doctrines the IACtHR created the
principle of effet utile/effectiveness: the Court is to review the consequences of the
enforcement and if the chosen policy is the most effective in achieving the goals of the
Convention as defined by the IACtHR. Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 39, ¶¶ 68–74 (1998);
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 68, ¶¶ 136–37 (Aug. 16, 2000); Castillo Peruzzi et al. v. Peru, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 50, ¶¶ 205–07 (1999);
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power to review not only if domestic legislation is compatible with the Convention,
but also its “effectiveness.” 240 This implies the power to order the structural
remedies necessary to achieve that effectiveness and monitor its compliance.241 An
example of the structural approach can be found in Barrios Altos v. Peru, a case
where the Court departed from exclusively signaling that domestic legislation was
incompatible with the Convention and asserted a power to directly invalidate
domestic law. The Court expressly stated that once domestic legislation is found
incompatible with the Convention it “lack[s] legal effects”242 and that the scope of
this decision is “general in nature.”243
Recently, the Court has also stated that domestic judiciaries have an
obligation to exercise a: “‘conventionality control’ between the domestic legal
provisions which are applied to specific cases and the [Convention]. To perform
this task, the [domestic] Judiciary has to take into account not only the treaty, but
also the interpretation thereof made by the [IACtHR], which is the ultimate
interpreter of the [Convention].” 244 This duty is in addition to traditional
constitutionality control or judicial review within their respective jurisdictions.245

Suarez Rosero v. Ecuador, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser.
C) No. 35, ¶¶ 97–98 (1997); International Responsibility for the Promulgation and
Enforcement of Laws in Violation of the Convention, Advisory Opinion OC-14/97, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14 (Dec. 9, 1994), ¶ 23.
240
Supra note 239.
241
Baena Ricardo v. Panama, Competence, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No.
104, § III (Nov. 28, 2003); James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating
Regional Human Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the InterAmerican Court 768, 781 (Harv. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper Series,
Paper No. 09-31, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1404608
(explaining that on the basis of its own interpretation of its mandate, the Court retains
jurisdiction to monitor compliance with its judgments and issues periodic compliance orders).
242
Barrios Altos v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶ 51 (Sept. 3, 2001) (finding that Amnesty Laws No. 26479 and No.
26492 are incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and, consequently,
lack legal effect).
243
Compare id. ¶ 18 (“[T]he effects of the decision in the judgment on the merits of
the Barrios Altos Cases are general in nature”), with Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 67 (“The
invalidation of national norms with general effects is a typical power of a constitutional court
exercising judicial review, not of an international tribunal determining international
responsibility of a State.”).
244
Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, 124 (Sept. 26, 2006).; Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 58 (“In
the past, the Court consistently insisted that domestic norms, including a State’s constitution,
need to conform to the Convention. But up to Almonacid, it never required judges to directly
apply the Convention. It always left it to the judicial authorities’ discretion how to secure
such compatibility. Of course, the wide latitude simultaneously requires full compliance
with the treaty.”).
245
Dulitzky, supra note 8, at 70 (“In this metamorphosis of the Convention from an
international treaty to a hierarchically superior domestic norm, the Court is asking local
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In 2006, the Court mandated that the control must be done ex-officio using the
principle of effet utile of the Convention.246 In 2012, it continued expanding the
content of the test by mandating local judiciaries to include it in their reparation
stages.247 In other words, domestic high courts have a duty to use the Convention
as the baseline of their constitutional powers, and in doing so they are bounded by
the jurisprudence and the remedies orders of the IACtHR. If the domestic
constitutional jurisprudence contradicts the decisions of the IACtHR, the
supranational standard must be upheld even above the constitutional traditions of
the highest courts. 248
To some commentators, the Court’s expansive jurisprudence is
ungrounded in the text of the Convention. 249 The conventionality control has
recently transformed the Convention into “a text that is very different from the one
that the States that participated in the San Jose Conference approved.” 250 The
Court’s aggressive work has transformed it into an antidemocratic institution.251
tribunals to exercise both judicial review and conventionality control even if those tribunals
are not constitutionally authorized to perform them.”).
246
The Dismissed Congressional Employees (Aguado Alfaro et.al) v. Peru, Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 158, at 128 (Nov. 24,
2006) (“When a State has ratified an international treaty such as the American Convention,
the judges are also subject to it; this obliges them [judges] to ensure that the effet util of the
Convention is not reduced or annulled by the application of laws contrary to its provisions,
object and purpose.”).
247
Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, at 281, 284 (Feb. 24, 2012) (dealing with the illegal use
of the sexual orientation of a mother to determine the custody of her daughters after her
divorce).
248
Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, The Conventionality Control: Examples of (Un)
Successful Experiences in Latin America, 3 INTER-AM. EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 200, 203–04 (2010)
(arguing that “national authorities have a narrow discretion, and therefore they should carry
out a narrow conventionality control, since the matter has been already decided by the
IACtHR. On the contrary, in [cases that have not been decided by the IACtHR], national
authorities have a broad margin of appreciation, and consequently they are entitled to proceed
with a broad conventionality control.”); Humberto Nogueira Alcalá, Diálogo
Interjurisdiccional, Control de Convencionalidad y Jurisprudencia Del Tribunal
Constitucional En Período 2006-2011, 10 ESTUD. CONST. 57, 531–40 (2012). According to
Professor Ariel Dulitzky, most of these contradictions might not resolve in the long-term due
to the requirement to exhaust domestic remedies at the local level. Ariel E. Dulitzky, An
Inter-American Constitutional Court-The Invention of the Conventionality Control by the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 50 TEX. INT'L L.J. 45, 72–73 (2015) (“[T]he Latin
American [local] interpretation of the Convention could be consistent with, partially
consistent with, or contradictory to current or future Inter-American case law or among other
domestic Latin American decisions . . . the potential for intra-judicial conflict is omnipresent
in a pluralistic system where multiple high courts and judges assert jurisdiction over the
Convention.”).
249
Malarino, supra note 233, at 26–27.
250
Id. at 27–28.
251
Id. at 29.
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The Court has become an activist court that is aiming “judicially to modify the law
with the intention of adapting it to the social needs of the moment (naturally, those
social needs that are identified as desirable by the judges).”252 Moreover, the Court
may have recognized new rights, but it also has ignored the expressly recognized
rights in the Convention of those who are accused as perpetrators of rights
violations. Finally, the Court, through its jurisprudence on remedies, has invaded
the functions of the domestic judiciaries, legislative, and executive branches.
Regardless of the underlying flaws or merits on the doctrinal work of the
Court, it is safe to conclude that this international body has tried to emulate
constitutional courts. The supranational body has been aiming at domestic
judiciaries to harness their power, and it has tried to make the Convention a
component of the domestic legal system in which its final interpreter is the IACtHR
itself.253 That is, the IACtHR has asserted judicial supremacy in very similar terms
to the US Supreme Court. It is the ultimate interpreter of how power is to be
exercised by domestic authorities. In this effort, the highest courts are to be the
domestic enforces of the IACtHR.
We can conclude that the IACtHR treats the Convention in a formalistic
way, as the highest court of the land would treat its constitution.254 Yet, there are
no other branches with elected officials controlling its functions, nor a sovereign
state that recognizes it as a constitutional court, or a global executive power that
will enforce all of its decisions. Moreover, building on the arguments described in
previous sections, maintaining a constitutional adjudicatory system, supporting its
institutions, and financing its task, depends ultimately on political actors. It is
unrealistic to assert that the survival of the Inter-American system depends solely
on adequate legal reasoning. Just as the maintenance of a constitutional system is
a political task, so is the maintenance of a Conventional human rights system.
Expansive international human rights treaties or constitutions “cannot survive if
they are too politically costly to maintain, and they cannot survive if they are too
distant from normal political concerns.”255 These political instruments thrive when
they are “embraced and reenacted” by the operators of the system, such as judges,
252

Malarino, supra note 233, at 29.
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19; Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Professors Posner and Yoo, CAL.
L. REV. 899 (2005).
254
Contrary to what some commentators argue, this doctrinal expansion is not
exclusively an influence from the European institutions, mainly the ECtHR. It is my
contention that to see the expansion as merely mimicking the European process is to misread
what motivates the Court’s jurisprudence. Yes, Europe influenced some of the IACtHR’s
substantive interpretations, but its remedies jurisprudence and the conventionality control are
unparalleled in international adjudication. For example, the ECtHR has mainly awarded
monetary compensations. It did not engage in other type of remedies until very recently as a
way to reduce the number of applications. Compare Antkowiak, supra note 9, at 355, with
G. L. Neuman, supra note 144, at 101–123, 101–02, and L. Lixinski, Treaty Interpretation
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Expansionism at the Service of the Unity of
International Law, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 585, 585–604 (2010).
255
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 26.
253
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government officials, citizens, and practitioners.256 They cannot serve as guardians
of the government’s acts if they stand outside of politics. In the words of Keith
Whittington, “the crucial problem is not that judicial interpretations cannot remain
‘objective’ and ‘neutral’ and sealed off from political considerations. The more
fundamental problem is that the Court’s judgments will have no force unless other
powerful political actors accept the importance of the interpretative task and the
priority of the judicial voice.”257 Just as such an understanding is necessary at the
domestic level, we need to understand why government officials who have no
strings attached to the international system and can intimidate, co-opt, ignore, or
dismantle the IACtHR, would be willing to use the Inter-American system and defer
to the judicial authority of the Court. When the IACtHR has been able to establish
its authority successfully, other political or judicial actors must have had reasons
for allowing the supranational court to assert its authority. This is the subject to be
analyzed in the next section.
V. THE EFFECTS OF THE EXPANSION OF THE IACTHR ON
DOMESTIC INTER-BRANCH POLITICS
This paper has asserted that executives use their prerogative of being the
official representative of the state in the IACtHR adjudicatory system and control
which cases and arguments will be defended. For example, the executive decides
whether the judiciary will participate in the defense of the state when the case is
about judicial processes. The executive decides if the state will defend the acts of
judges and prosecutors, or concede that they are insufficient and invite the
supranational court to order domestic judges to take a different approach. Based on
the arguments expressed in previous sections, we can conclude that when a Latin
American state decides not to defend its case before the IACtHR, this strategy may
invite the Court to adopt expansive measures and order policies and legislative
changes agreeable to the executive.
This section overviews the cases in which Latin American presidents have
decided not to defend the state or downplay certain defenses. The section begins
with an overview of the domestic political contexts in which this has happened:
mainly contexts of politically divided governments that prevent the incoming
coalitions from modifying preexisting constitutional understandings. It then turns
to three cases of study involving Venezuela, Chile and Costa Rica. In these cases,
local executives agreed with the supranational court’s agenda and allowed its
influence. The Court’s expansion gave the executive the pretext to impose an
agenda that domestically could have been harder to achieve with political parties or
social opposition. Moreover, the cases are an example of the evolution of the Court
to a more politically consequential court at the domestic level through its reasoning.
The Venezuelan case took place in the early stages of the expansive movement of
the Court; the Chilean case was one of the first cases in which the Court ordered a
256
257

WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 26.
Id.
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state to modify its constitution on issues not related to amnesties; the Costa Rican
case offers the opportunity to review the latest effort of the Court to make its
remedies more expansive at the domestic level and to modify the way domestic
constitutional courts’ reason about rights.
A. From Opposition to Government in Power
The cases in which executives have used the IACtHR to impose a
particular political agenda are frequently cases in which the incoming government
faces opposition from a previously dominant political coalition. The strong
resistance of political coalitions to new governments is not uncommon in Latin
America where politics are highly polarized in ideological terms.258 The incoming
governments reach power with a “reconstructive agenda,” with ambitious political
projects that seek to articulate new ways for the government to function under a
“progressive” understanding of the constitutional order.259 Presidents that emerged
out of opposition parties determine that it is in their best interest to allow the
expansion of the IACtHR’s influence. Instead of imposing a new political agenda
expanding their own constitutional powers, and consequently reviving the
258
See generally Angel Oquendo, Address at Yale Latin American Seminar on
Constitutional and Political Theory: The Politicization of Human Rights (2013). It is not
uncommon in Latin America to find that government from the right— in favor of free market,
neoliberal in terms of social policies, and linked to the Catholic church—are followed
immediately by governments from the left—in favor of state intervention, popular in their
social policies, linked to Marxist or guerilla groups of the 1970s. See Guillermo O’Donnell,
MODERNIZATION AND BUREAUCRATIC-AUTHORITARIANISM: STUDIES IN SOUTH AMERICAN
POLITICS, Chapter II, (international studies, University of California Berkley) (1973). See
generally David Collier ed., THE NEW AUTHORITARIANISM IN LATIN AMERICA, (Princeton
Univ. Press, 1980) (providing a review of the Catholic church and its role in politics); Harry
E. Vanden & Gary Prevost, POLITICS OF LATIN AMERICA, Chapter Six, (NY, Oxford Univ.
press, 2002) (providing a review of the use of human rights narratives by the political
spectrum from the right and left); LUIS RONIGER & MARIO SZNAJDER, THE LEGACY OF
HUMAN-RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN CONE: ARGENTINA, CHILE AND URUGUAY, Ch.
I (Oxford. Univ. Press, 1999) (discussing how former guerilla fighters were elected to office
in Brazil); Paulo Prada, Ex-Guerrilla on Cusp of Power in Brazil, WALL STR. J. (Sept. 30,
2010),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487047910045755201713955955.
For example, in the recent presidential election in Argentina, after the government of Nestor
and Kristina Kirshner that was strongly in the left spectrum, and that rose into power after
the debacle of the Menem neoliberal administration in the late 1990s, which was followed
by the government of Macri, who is linked to the right oriented political parties in favor of
neoliberal policies. Simon Romero & Jonathan Gilbert, In Rebuke to Kirchner, Argentines
Elect Opposition Leader Mauricio Macri as President, N. Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/23/world/americas/argentina-president-electionmauricio-macri.html.
259
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 286. In a way these governments are closer to the
reconstructive presidencies in the United States in terms of their ambitious projects against
the existing governing coalitions. Id.
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sentiments of presidential authoritarianism or hyper-presidentialism—something
that they themselves rejected when being in the opposition—they have the potential
to impose their agendas using the IACtHR interpretative authority.260
These incoming governments gain authority by repudiating what came
before them; their political power emerges from their reconstructive agenda. In
these cases, the displaced regime, which could be the one established by the military
juntas (i.e. Chile and Argentina) or a right-neoliberal oriented government (i.e. Peru
and Venezuela in the early 1990s), is still vibrant, popular, and resilient to
changes.261 The opposition might have been able to win the election, but once it
gets into power it has few initial resources to restructure preexisting governmental
practices, structures, or policies.262
If the previous coalition in power remained in control for long enough,
there are high chances that the domestic judiciary and the bureaucracies will be
reluctant to cooperate with the incoming coalition. 263 Judicial-executive relations
are less than ideal in this context. 264 The incoming president is likely to disagree
with the constitutional understandings of the highest court of the time. 265 If their

260
GARGARELLA, supra note 22 (arguing that Latin American constitutionalism has
always been a continuous fight over the control of hyper-presidentialism, and even with the
emergence of liberal constitutions that give additional powers to congress and the judiciary,
the president has always retain a central position of the political process).
261
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161 (“Not all oppositional leaders who gain power
can claim the authority to reconstruct the inherited constitutional order. Their claims on
political leadership are more modest and more tenuous. Unlike presidents such as Jefferson,
Jackson, Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt, who stand in opposition to a vulnerable set of
constitutional commitments ready to be toppled over, other oppositional presidents merely
‘preempt’ a continuing partisan and political order. Such oppositional candidates may
manage to win election, but they come to office with relatively little authority and few
resources with which to increase their authority. The regime they oppose is still vibrant,
popular, and resilient to pressure. Such presidents must learn to accommodate themselves to
the dominant regime in order to be successful.”).
262
Id.
263
Nuno Garoupa & Maria A. Maldonado, The Judiciary in Political Transitions: The
Critical Role of US Constitutionalism in Latin America, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
593, 596 (2011) (“On the other hand, the judiciary has largely been appointed, influenced,
and dominated by the previous political regime, and has therefore been suspected of
potentially undermining the foundations of the new democratic regime. The respect for the
rule of law and the proper adherence of the judiciary to the new political regime create a
conceptual and practical problem.”); Christopher J. Walker, Toward Democratic
Consolidation? The Argentine Supreme Court, Judicial Independence, and the Rule of Law,
18 FL. J. INT'L L. 745, 758 (2006).
264
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161; Garoupa & Maldonado, supra note 263, at
758.
265
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161 (“Judicial authority to interpret the
Constitution within the politics of opposition is likely to be secure, but the relationship
between the Court and the president in such situations is hardly idyllic. Reconstructive
presidents are likely to disagree with the constitutional understandings of the Court, and they
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political power is insufficient to displace the existing understanding, it has the
capacity to do so using its powers to control the official defense of the state in the
Inter-American System.266
As explained above, the role of judges in the local judicial system forms
part of the claims in most of cases decided by the IACtHR. In principle, victims
must exhaust domestic remedies before bringing the case to the Inter-American
system. Hence, the presidents have a monopoly over the type of arguments that
will be made at the international level regarding the domestic legal system’s
compliance with international standards. This prerogative is similar to the one
found in the United States regarding the president’s influence on the DOJ in
determining the official position of the federal government in judicial
proceedings. 267 Instead of accommodating the existing regime, these types of
governments have used the cases in the IACtHR to advance their agenda. In fact,
it is not uncommon to find in the Court’s caseload many cases that may have been
initiated by the entering coalition when they were part of the opposition.268 It takes
so many years for the system to process the cases that by the time they reach the
IACtHR the incumbent government may have been the opposition when the case
was generated and the responsible actors may no longer be in power.269
In sum, if the incoming presidential coalition is ambitious enough to try
to modify the existing constitutional understanding protected by the highest court,
it still has one way to go if its efforts fail at the domestic level. Naturally, this
situation is also dependent on the fact that the incoming presidency is sympathetic
with the conventional understanding of the IACtHR. If this happens, the executive
will find ways to support the independent authority of the Court to act on those
understandings at the domestic level. 270 The different ways in which this has
happened are: (1) a downplay of the plausible defenses by the state in the concrete
case; (2) the open recognition of the violations in the proceedings; (3) an invitation
to move to the remedies stages; (4) a non-defense of the domestic judicial process
or the decisions of domestic courts; and finally; (5) in the most extreme cases, a
non-defense of the State. These types of responses become opportunities for the
IACtHR to display and enhance its role in restructuring what the Court considers to
have the ambitions and capacity to displace the judicial authority to interpret the Constitution
with their own.”); Garoupa & Maldonado, supra note 263.
266
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161.
267
Id. at 196 (“The president has nearly a free hand in determining the official position
of the federal government on issues that come before the bench. Through control over the
Justice Department, the president can exercise significant influence over what cases are
moved through the appellate process and what arguments are presented before the Court. In
other words, federal government is a powerful and often successful litigant, and the president
has almost exclusive control over that dimension of the government.”).
268
See infra Sections V.B. and V.C. (exemplifying Venezuela and Chile).
269
Id.
270
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161 (“Presidents who are more sympathetic with
the constitutional understandings of the Court are likely to find reason to support the
independent authority of the Court to act on those understandings.”).
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be deficient aspects of domestic legal systems.271 They are invitations from the
executives to the supranational court to “put its stamp” on the domestic
constitutional order.272
When the case exclusively involves actions of the administration in power,
the opposite might happen. The defense of the state is a defense of the sitting
executive and becomes a direct confrontation to the Inter-American System.273 The
point here is that one cannot establish a priori that it will always be in the interest
of the executive to defend the state in the international forum; to the contrary losing
the case or giving an official recognition of a violation to the Convention might be
the best strategy available to the executive for promoting its agenda at the domestic
level.274
The unfolding tensions in Latin America are consistent with the cases
identified by Whittington regarding US “preemptive” presidencies and by
comparative constitutional law scholars in new democracies. 275 As mentioned
before, these types of presidencies and their political coalitions take power by
opposing the existing regime, and carrying few partisan commitments or political
expectations that they must satisfy with the status quo.276 Yet, in order to sway
public policy towards their agenda, they rely on the power of the Supreme Court.277
In reaffirming judicial supremacy over defining the constitutional understandings
of the state, they can try to convince the Court to work in their favor. 278 The
existence of structures that guarantee fragmented political authority, such as
democratic systems of government with formal separations of power and/or with
divided authority between central and local governments, becomes a variable that
helps to explain the expansion of political consequential courts. These systems tend
to face scenarios in which it becomes difficult for political leaders to challenge
271

WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 161, at 229. (arguing that the preemptive
presidents “create opportunities for the Court to display and enhance its own independent,
leadership role within American constitutional development. Whether they are actively
turning new problems over to the courts or simply expressing their willingness to live with
whatever decisions that the Court might make, these presidents invite the Court to actively
put its stamp on the Constitution.”).
272
Id.
273
See infra Section IV.B.
274
See generally WHITTINGTON, supra note 11; Galanter, supra note 11.
275
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 164; CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at
23 (“It is taken as a truism among public law scholars that the fragmentation of political
authority (divided government in a separation of powers system, weak multiparty coalitions,
or fractionalized ruling parties) decreases the likelihood that political leaders can swiftly
nullify or reverse assertive judicial ruling, thus offering courts greater opportunity to play
active role sin governance.”).
276
WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 229 (“For preemptive presidents, who often find
themselves at odds with Congress and standing on a fragile electoral base, picking fights with
the judiciary would be self-defeating. The independence and supremacy of the judiciary is as
much a strategic asset for these presidents as it is for affiliated leaders.”).
277
Id.
278
Id.

606

Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law

Vol. 34, No. 3

2017

judicial power, but also to impose their own agenda. 279 The existence of politically
divided governments offers courts an opportunity to redefine constitutional
understandings, and consequently expand their power. When the political forces
are divided, judges have an opportunity to become more politically
consequential.280 When the political forces are united behind a strong leader or a
political movement or coalition, all the formal structural elements that fragment
authority can be used to constrain courts.
The following subsections will show three cases in which the executive
used its monopoly over the defense of the state to stir domestic constitutional and
political understanding in its favor. The analysis will begin with an overview of the
political contexts in which the case emerged, the constitutional provisions that
regulate international human rights treaties, and the key legal aspects that surround
the controversies. The analysis will then turn to the proceedings before the InterAmerican Commission of Human Rights, how this body interacted with the state,
and how the case was framed before the IACtHR. The overview of the cases will
conclude with the decisions of the IACtHR and their effects on inter-branch politics,
particularly on the relationship between the executive and the domestic judiciary. I
must clarify that the emphasis in the analysis of the cases will be placed on the
parties and on the orders from the international bodies. The section will focus on
the actors involved, the arguments presented, and who benefits from the Court’s
decisions. The doctrinal evolution of the rights discussed by the Court will only be
analyzed in this context.
B. Venezuela as a Case of Study: The Caracazo Case
The case of Venezuela is an example of how constitutional and legal
structures that are textually favorable for a good interaction with the IACtHR can
be manipulated, using a human rights discourse, to reject the imposition of
particular views from the San Jose Court. Before the Chavez Constitution entered
into force in 1999, the judiciary in Venezuela tended to be very passive and played
a limited role in the institutional arrangements of the country. After the 1999
Constitution, the Supreme Tribunal has become a very active body, settling disputes
among branches, restructuring social policies, and even challenging the IACtHR.
For some commentators, it has become a politically consequential court for the
wrong reasons to advance the particular ideological agenda of the Chavez regime.281
279

WHITTINGTON, supra note 11, at 229.
CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS, supra note 11, at 24. Regardless of the tradition of
independence that courts might have, which is in itself a difficult variable to measure, the
consensus in case studies is that “fragmentation in ruling parties and coalitions appears to be
an important factor stimulating and sustaining judicial role expansion.” Id.
281
Garoupa & Maldonado, supra note 263, at 602–03; Lauren Castaldi, Judicial
Independence Threatened in Venezuela: The Removal of Venezuelan Judges and the
Complications of Rule of Law Reform, 37 GEO. J. INT'L L. 477,477–78 (2005). See generally
ALLAN-RANDOLPH BREWER CARÍAS, DISMANTLING DEMOCRACY IN VENEZUELA: THE
CHÁVEZ AUTHORITARIAN EXPERIMENT (2010).
280
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Furthermore, the case of Venezuela shows how even a left oriented
populist government can use the system to its advantage to dismantle previous
political coalitions when coming into power. A central element of this strategy is
the power of the executive to defend the State in international proceedings. As the
political coalitions abandon their position as opposition groups and become the
ruling power, then the system can be used against them.
1. The Early Months of Chavez in Power
In 1999, Hugo Chavez Frias, a former military officer who was once
imprisoned for having led a failed coup d’état, won the presidency of Venezuela.
He was the first president of Venezuela since 1958 that did not come from the two
traditional parties (Copei and Acción Democratica). 282 In the ten years before
Chavez’s arrival into power these two parties tried to implement a series of
neoliberal economic reforms in Venezuela, but the economy stagnated due to the
fall of oil prices and production.283 Millions of Venezuelans were in poverty and
blamed the pre-existing political coalition for it.284 President Chavez’s agenda was
openly socialist and aimed at reforming the existing institutions and neoliberal
policies.285
During the first months of this presidency, Hugo Chavez held personal
meetings with the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights.286 This was the
first time that a sitting president in Latin America went to visit the Commission at
its headquarters in Washington D.C., let alone a mere couple of months after taking
office.287 After the meeting with the members of the Commission, who at that time
were investigating crimes committed in 1989 by the previous political regime in the
Caracazo case, President Chavez invited the Commission to do an in loco visit and

282
Judith Ewell, Venezuela since 1930, 8 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN AMERICA.
727, 785–90 (1991) (providing a history of the distribution of power between the two main
powers up to the early 1990s).
283
Osmel Manzano & Francisco Monaldi, The Political Economy of Oil Production
in Latin America, 9 ECONOMÍA 59, 86–87 (2008); DANIEL YERGIN, THE QUEST: ENERGY,
SECURITY AND THE REMAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD 122 (2011).
284
YERGIN, supra note 283, at 122.
285
Daniel Hellinger, When “No” Means “Yes to Revolution”: Electoral Politics in
Bolivarian Venezuela, 32 LAT. AM. PERSP. 8, 14 (2005); Cristóbal Valencia Ramírez,
Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution: Who Are the Chavistas?, 32 LAT. AM. PERSP. 79, 84
(2005); Carles Muntaner et al., Venezuela’s Barrio Adentro: An Alternative to Neoliberalism
in Health Care, 36 INT'L J. HEALTH SERV. 803 (2006).
286
Press Release, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Press Release No. 24/99, Inter American
Commission Press Release No 24/99 (1999), http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/Spanish/
1999/Comunicado%2024-99.htm; Capítulo II Bases Jurídicas y Actividades de la Cidh
Durante, Inter-Am. Comm'n H.R., Activity Report (1999), , https://www.cidh.oas.org/
annualrep/99span/capitulo2.htm.
287
Supra note 285.
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praised its work in defending human rights in the region.288 The Caracazo case
dealt directly with decisions made by the previous President of Venezuela, Carlos
Andres Perez (the same President that Chavez tried to remove in the failed coup
d’état).289 The claims involved the suppression of a popular uprising against the
structural adjustment measures ordered as part of a deal to refinance the external
national debt.290 During the revolts, then-President Carlos Andres Perez suspended
constitutional rights to repress riots in the major cities of Venezuela. The measures
included a general curfew and security operations by the National Guard and
Army.291 The suspension of rights lasted for several weeks; by the time order was
restored, hundreds of individuals died and an unspecified number of citizens were
wounded, disappeared, or suffered major material losses.292
2. The Recognition of Responsibility before the IACtHR
Chavez’ eagerness to cooperate with the system and put the previous
regime on trial was reaffirmed a couple of months after his Washington visit when
the Inter-American Commission brought the Caracazo case to the IACtHR. In its
first hearing before the Court, the Chavez regime conceded all the alleged facts and
took full responsibility for the Venezuelan government’s actions taken against the
citizens of Caracas in 1989.293 The Chavez regime requested the Court to proceed
to the remedies stage and offered to comply with all reparations and compensation
orders from the Court.294 Moreover, it offered to pay compensation to the victims—
not only the ones included in the claim before the Court, but also any other victims
or their relatives. 295 It created a special prosecution unit to continue the
investigation against the officers responsible for the actions and filed a request
before the Supreme Court of Venezuela to assert jurisdiction over the criminal
288

Supra note 285.
Caracazo Merits, supra note 25, at ¶ 2.
290
Id.
291
Id.; Caracazo v. Venezuela, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 95, ¶ 66.2 (Aug. 29, 2002) [hereinafter Caracazo Reparations].
292
Caracazo Reparations, supra note 291, ¶ 66.3 (“[A]ccording to the recount of the
facts the official figure of 276 civilian deaths was contested by the fact that years later several
common graves were found in the surroundings with unidentified bodies. The vast majority
of the killings were done by the military forces and caused by random shot fires or
extrajudicial executions.”).
293
Caracazo Merits, supra note 25, ¶ 39.
294
Id.; Caracazo Reparations supra note 291, ¶ 19. In a subsequent declaration during
the reparation stages the regime even stated that it “accepted the case law of the Court
regarding reparations” and that it “could provide whatever necessary information was
requested by the Court and would ‘in good faith, accept the truthfulness of all information
submitted by the applicants or their representatives, with prior sworn statements that the
content of said information is truthful, so as to accelerate this case inasmuch as possible.’”
Id.
295
Caracazo Merits, supra note 25, ¶ 39; Caracazo Reparations supra note 291, ¶ 19.
289
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investigations in military tribunals.296 The IACtHR also ordered a reform of the
criminal code, the military code, and any other regulation or measure that prevented
the state from investigating and prosecuting those responsible for the acts
committed.297
After the decision of the Court, a new constitution was adopted in
December 1999 by national referendum.298 The new constitutional text contained
a set of provisions that gave constitutional hierarchy to human rights treaties signed
and ratified by Venezuela (Article 19 and 23).299 Moreover, Article 31 recognized
the right of any Venezuelan to bring claims against the state in supranational human
rights bodies. 300 The IACtHR’s decision also helped President Chavez reform the
Military Justice Code so that the President could exercise exorbitant powers in the
ambit of military jurisdiction. 301 Human rights covenants and the proceedings
before the IACtHR became two of the instruments of the incoming Chavez regime
to reform the state, control the military institutions that had been loyal to the
previous regime and establish his Bolivarian revolution. This same government in
2013 denounced the American Convention and the jurisdiction of the Court. 302

296

Caracazo Reparations, supra note 291, ¶ 66.12.
Id. ¶¶ 119–20.
298
REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA CONSTITUCIÓN [CONSTITUTION], Dec. 30,
1999. See also Michael A. Lebowitz, Venezuela: A Good Example of the Bad Left of Latin
America, 59 MONT. L. REV. 38 (2007) (discussing the contradictions of the Chavez
Constitution).
299
REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA CONSTITUCIÓN [CONSTITUTION], supra
note 298. “The State shall guarantee to every individual, in accordance with the progressive
principle and without discrimination of any kind, no renounceable, indivisible and
interdependent enjoyment and exercise of human rights. Respect for and the guaranteeing of
these rights is obligatory for the organs of Public Power, in accordance with the Constitution,
the human rights treaties signed and ratified by the Republic and any laws developing the
same.” Id. art. 19. “The treaties, pacts and conventions relating human rights which have
been executed and ratified by Venezuela have a constitutional rank, and prevail over internal
legislation, insofar as they contain provisions concerning the enjoyment and exercise of such
rights that are more favorable than those established by this Constitution and the laws of the
Republic, and shall be immediately and directly applied by the courts and other organs of the
Public Power.” Id. art. 23.
300
Id. art. 31 (“Everyone has the right, on the terms established by the human rights
treaties, pacts and conventions ratified by the Republic, to address petitions and complaints
to the intentional organs created for such purpose, in order to ask for protection of his or her
human rights. The State shall adopt, in accordance with the procedures established under this
Constitution and by the law, such measures as may be necessary to enforce the decisions
emanating from international organs as provided for under this article.”).
301
Caracazo Merits, supra note 25, ¶ 39; Caracazo Reparations, supra note 291, ¶
44.
302
Press Release, Organization of American States, IACHR Deeply Concerned over
Result of Venezuela’s Denunciation of the American Convention (Aug. 1, 2009) (on file at
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2013/064.asp); Diego German MejiaLemos, Venezuela’s Denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights | ASIL,
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This happened after the Chavez regime faced several cases brought against it by the
opposition. 303 The decision to abandon the system was also fueled by a series of
bad experiences with the Commission.304 For example, the Commission failed in
2002 to order immediate provisional measures to ensure the safety of imprisoned
Chavez officials during a three-day coup attempt against the regime.305
Two more detailed examples will be discussed in the following
subsections, but the case of Venezuela shows how even the most politically radical
governments, when entering into power after facing long periods of a pre-existing
political regimes, can use the system to their advantage and dismantle previous
constitutional and political understandings.
C. Chile as a Case of Study: The Last Temptation of Christ Case
1. The 1980 Constitution and Transition
From 1973 to 1990, Chile was governed by a military junta under the
leadership of General Augusto Pinochet. During the authoritarian times, the
judiciary “capitulated to, and in some ways colluded with, the Pinochet
dictatorship.”306 According to recent studies and reports of the Truth Commission,
judges denied around 8,000 habeas corpus claims during the dictatorship.307 This
judicial passivity allowed the military to continue their practices of forced
disappearance, torture, and extrajudicial executions.308
Due in part to international pressures and social opposition, in 1980 the
regime adopted a new constitution, but allowed Pinochet to remain in power until
1989.309 After a series of negotiations between the existing military government
and the opposition coalition of center-left and Christian Democrats, the
concertación, Pinochet agreed in 1988 to a poll on whether he should stay in power
as the President of the Republic. The concertación coalition won the referendum.
In 1990, Patricio Aylwin, one of the leaders of the concertación, became the first
ASIL INSIGHTS (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/1/venezuelasdenunciation-american-convention-human-rights; Oquendo, supra note 258.
303
Oquendo, supra note 258.
304
Letter from Nicolas Maduro, the President of Venezuela, to the Secretary General
of the OAS (Sept. 6, 2012) (on file at http://www.minci.gob.ve/wpcontent/uploads/2013/09/Carta-Retiro-CIDH-Firmada-y-sello.pdf).
305
Id. at 5.
306
Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience, supra note 111, at 100.
307
Id.
308
Id.
309
Jan Eckel, “Under a Magnifying Glass” The International Human Rights
Campaign Against Chile in the Seventies, HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 321,
321 (2010) (describing how the bloody takeover of the military in Chile “gave rise to one of
the longest and most intense human rights campaigns ever rise to be waged against a single
regime. It stretched over the entire sixteen years of the military junta’s existence, from 1973
to 1989, flaring up every time new shocking details reached the media.”).
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transition president of Chile.310 This coalition ruled for the next ten years. Although
some elements of the 1980 Constitution were amended in 1989 after the fall of
Pinochet, its structure remained very close to what the military regime had
approved. Moreover, regarding structure and appointments, the judiciary remained
untouched by the transition of power.311 As part of the transition agreement, the
new administration maintained an Amnesty Law passed in 1978 (1978 Amnesty
Law) by the Pinochet regime for all the crimes committed during the first years of
the military coup by both army officers and the opposition. 312 Instead of
prosecutions, President Aylwin created a truth commission.313
The fact that the 1980 Constitution was adopted by the Pinochet military
regime does not mean that it lacked the essential elements of what the progressives
would consider a modern constitution, mainly the incorporation of an elaborate
system of judicial review of legislation and administrative acts.314 The constitution
established a mixed or disseminated system of control of the constitutionality of
laws and administrative acts. On the one hand, the Constitutional Court exercised
an abstract control, or preventive control, of the constitutionality of legislation or
executive decrees before they enter into force. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court and the Appellate Courts exercise a regular judicial review, or concrete a
posteriori review, of all laws, decrees, and administrative acts in force that violate
individual rights.315
310

Javier Couso, The Politics of Judicial Review in Chile in the Era of Democratic
Transition, 1990-2002, DEMOCRATIZATION AND THE JUDICIARY 1, 75 (2004).
311
Garoupa & Maldonado, supra note 263, at 623.
312
Ruiz-Chiriboga, supra note 248, at 212; Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty
Conscience, supra note 111, at 103; Almonacid Arellano et al. v. Chile, Merits, Reparations,
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶ 82.10 (Sept. 26, 2006).
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Huneeus, Judging from a Guilty Conscience, supra note 111, at 103.
314
Couso, supra note 310, at 72 (“The history of judicial review in Chile is relatively
new, effectively dating from 1980. The new charter incorporated a complex system of
judicial review of both legislation and administrative acts. This represented a significant
change in the country’s legal tradition, which had lacked a meaningful system of judicial
review of the constitutionality of laws.”).
315
Id. at 72–73 (“Chile’s system of judicial review is peculiar. It consists of a number
of mechanisms spread among different constitutional bodies, representing what Chilean legal
scholars call a ‘mixed’ or ‘disseminated’ system of control of the constitutionality of laws
and administrative acts. The system is thus characterized by a division of labor between a
Constitutional Court (Tribunal Constitucional) in charge of the ‘preventive’ control of the
constitutionality of laws and executive decrees; the superior courts of the regular judiciary
(the Cortes de Apelaciones and Corte Suprema), with jurisdiction over a newly devised
constitutional injunction, the writ of protection (recurso de proteccion); a rarely used writ of
non-applicability of laws (recurso de inaplicabilidad); and a special body endowed with the
power to exercise control of the constitutionality of administrative acts (Contraloria General
de la Republica). According to this scheme, the Constitutional Court performs an ‘abstract’
(or a priori) review of the constitutionality of legislation, that is, the review of bills approved
by Congress but not yet promulgated, while the regular judiciary performs the ‘concrete’ (or
‘a posteriori’) review of already existing laws and executive decrees violating individual
rights thought the writs of protection and non-applicability.”).
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Regarding the hierarchy of human rights treaties in the constitutional
system, the Constitution of 1980 only stated in Article 5 that the “the exercise of
sovereignty recognizes as a limitation the respect for the essential rights which
emanate from human nature.”316 In 1989, as part of the negotiations of the transition
into democracy, a second paragraph was added to include that “it is the duty of the
organs of the State to respect and promote those rights, guaranteed by this
Constitution, and by the international treaties ratified by Chile and which are in
force.”317 There is nothing in the Constitution that clarifies the hierarchy of rights
in the Constitution vis-à-vis those in international treaties. It was left to the Chilean
courts to decide how to solve a conflict among them.318 Moreover, there is nothing
in the Constitution that forces the Chilean judges to consider as binding the
interpretation of international courts as binding.
Article 19 of the 1980 Constitution recognized, among other rights, the
right to protect the privacy and honor of the individual and the family, especially
against defamation from public media. 319 The same article protects freedom of
expression. 320 In order to regulate freedom of expression, the Constitution also
established a “system of censorship for the exhibition and publicity of
cinematographic productions.”321 The system was regulated by Decree Law No.
679, which authorized the Cinematographic Classification Council of the Ministry
of Education to supervise the exhibition and classification of films in Chile.322
In 1988, when the military junta was still in power, the Cinematographic
Classification Council refused to allow the exhibition of the film “The Last
Temptation of Christ.”323 The decision was appealed and confirmed by the Chilean
judiciary in 1989.324 In 1996, with the election of President Eduardo Frei from the
concertación coalition, the Council revoked its previous decision and allowed the
exhibition of the film.325 A group of Catholic lawyers filed a remedy of protection
316

CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE [CONSTITUTION] Oct. 24,
1980, art. 5.
317
Id.
318
The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 18 (citing the opinion of
expert Francisco Cumplido: “With the exception of the modification concerning artistic
entertainment that goes beyond the American Convention, the position was adopted that the
human rights embodied in the international treaties ratified by Chile in force should be
incorporated into the Constitution. Cinematographic censorship was left in force and the
possibility of establishing norms on the public expression of other artistic activities was
eliminated. It was argued that, should there be a contradiction between a right established in
the Constitution and a right established in an international treaty, the courts would resolve
it.”).
319
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE CHILE Oct. 24, 1980, art. 19; The Last
Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 21, ¶ 60.
320
The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 21, ¶ 60.
321
Id.
322
Id.
323
Id.
324
Id.
325
The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 21, ¶ 60(d).
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in the Court of Appeals of Santiago against the Council’s decision.326 The Court of
Appeals admitted the remedy of protection and annulled the Council’s decision
based on a balancing test between the right to freedom and the right to protect
honor. 327 This decision was then appealed to the Supreme Court of Chile and
reaffirmed by this body in 1997.328 The Chilean judges found that the Constitution
gave higher priority to the protection of privacy and honor because they were linked
to the dignity of the human being, while the right to freedom of expression was not
absolute and subject to constitutional restrictions.329 This conclusion was supported
by jurisprudential criteria of the Chilean superior courts in previous cases in which
the judges gave predominance to the right to honor over freedom of expression.330
The Chilean Supreme Court’s reasoning did not take into consideration human
rights treaties or the jurisprudence of the IACtHR. In reaction to the decision made
by the judiciary, President Frei submitted a draft constitutional reform to the
Chamber of Deputies that would eliminate the prior censorship of the exhibition
and publicity of cinematographic production.331 The draft was adopted in 1999 by
the Chamber of Deputies, but due to the constitutionally required amendment
process it remained in discussion on the Senate floor.332 In Chile, a constitutional
amendment can take up to seven years to be fully adopted.333
The facts surrounding the case show all the elements described in the
previous section: an incoming governing coalition controlling the executive faced
the opposition of the preexisting constitutional understanding—in this case,
embedded in the Constitution of 1980 and the reasoning of the Supreme Court of
Chile. The Executive then tried to modify the constitutional understanding through
legislative power, but politics and constitutional amendment requirements halted
the process. As it will be explained below, the Inter-American system helped the
executive advance its agenda and bypass the decision of the domestic judiciary.

326

The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 21, ¶ 60(e).
See generally id. at 17 (citing the opinion of expert Francisco Cumplido).
328
Id. at 21, ¶ 60(f).
329
Id. at 17 (quoting the opinion of expert Francisco Cumplido: “[t]he difficulty that
arose with the Supreme Court was due to a problem of interpretation, inasmuch as that Court
gave preference to applying the right to honor over freedom of opinion, following the trends
of some foreign courts and doctrine that makes a distinction between human rights that
correspond to the dignity of the individual such as the right to life, to honor and to intimacy,
and human rights concerning means, such as freedom of opinion and information.”).
330
The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 13 (citing the opinion of
expert Humberto Nogueira Alcala).
331
Id. at 24–25, ¶ 62.
332
Id. at 16, 24–25, ¶ 62.
333
Id. at 16 (quoting the opinion of expert Francisco Cumplido: “[s]ome reforms have
taken two years, others seven. Some have required extensive negotiations. Negotiations and
agreements have been necessary for most constitutional reforms, owing to the integration of
the political majorities.”).
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2. The Inter-American Process: Declining to Defend the Decisions of the
Judiciary and the Constitution
After the Supreme Court of Chile reaffirmed the decision to ban the
screening of the film, a group of lawyers brought a complaint on September 3, 1997
before the Inter-American Commission.334 A year later, the Commission issued its
report.335 It made reference to both the initiative of the executive to amend the
Constitution and the decision of the Chilean Supreme Court. 336 Regarding the
Supreme Court’s decision, the Commission found its reasoning “incompatible”
with the American Convention and that Chile should abolish the censorship over its
exhibition.337 Moreover, it argued that the Chilean constitutional provisions on the
restriction of the freedom of expression were also “incompatible” with the
Convention. 338 The Commission also explicitly “evaluat[ed] positively the
democratic Government of Chile’s initiatives aimed at the adoption by the
competent organs of the necessary legislative or other measures . . . to make
effective the rights to freedom of expression.”339 The Commission was describing
the Supreme Court of Chile as the actor responsible for the international
responsibility of the state for balancing the conflicting rights incorrectly. Yet, the
Commission was also giving a positive classification to the executive power for
sharing the same view as the Commission on how to balance the same rights. The
representatives of the state, as opposed to defending the government’s efforts to
comply with and explain to the Commission the legislative process that was
underway, failed to submit any information on how they were planning to comply
with its recommendations.340 The lack of response from the government triggered
the Commission to bring the case before the IACtHR in January 1999.341
In the early stages of the proceeding, the IACtHR constantly requested and
granted extensions to the state to present any objections to the application made by
the Commission.342 In several instances the state failed to present any brief, and
when it finally decided to do so, the Court rejected their brief because the statutory
time limit had expired. 343 Notwithstanding this fact, the records in the decision
show that the state did not contradict the Commission’s report. 344 The state
explicitly alleged in its brief that “it ha[d] no substantive discrepancies with the
334
335
336
337
338
339
340
341
342
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344

The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 24, ¶ 5.
Id. at 3, ¶ 10.
Id.
Id.
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The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 3, ¶ 10
Id. at 3, ¶ 11.
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Id at 4–7, ¶¶ 13, 18, 19, 24, 25, 30, 41.
Id. at 4–6, ¶¶ 18, 19, 20, 24, 25, 28, 30.
The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 24–25, ¶ 62.
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Commission.”345 Its only response to the Commission was an effort to clarify who
was the appropriate actor to blame at the domestic level for the violation.346 The
state argued that:
[i]n a message to the Congress, President Eduardo Frei ha[d]
indicated the Chilean Government’s position against prior
censorship . . . [and that] the government [did] not share the
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of Chile that gives preference
to the right to honor over freedom of expression . . . [a]n act of
the Judiciary that is contrary to international law may engage the
State’s international responsibility, provided that the State as a
whole assumes the criteria issues by the Judiciary; . . . the
acquiescence of the organ responsible for international relations,
which is the Executive Power, is required, and this ha[d] not
occurred in the instant case.347
In other words, the state did not present a defense on the arguments being
made by the Commission. Its defense rested on the fact that the President was in
general agreement with the Commission, and that there was no “acquiescence” from
the executive regarding the actions of the Judiciary.348 As such the President should
not be blamed for the violations committed by the judges.349 As mentioned above,
the main arguments against the state were not related to the actions taken by the
administration that was in power at the time, but rather were all related to the
domestic judiciary and the 1980 Constitution of the military junta. The
administration of President Frei had political reasons to not defend the judicial
actions and the constitutional provisions in the case. This same governmental actor
was fighting in the domestic political arena to leave both the decision of the local
high court and the constitutional provision without effect.
On February 5, 2001, when the Court issued its ruling, it had only taken
into consideration the brief presented by the Commission praising the efforts of the
Chilean executive branch and arguing that the Constitution and the decisions of the
Chilean Supreme Court were contrary to the Convention. 350 In fact the Court
recognized that “the State did not submit any type of evidence in answer to the
[Commission’s] application” and that “[d]uring the public hearing on the merits of
the case, Chile concentrated its defense on the argument that it had submitted a draft
reform to article 10(12) of the Constitution.”351 The expert opinions presented by
the Commission emphasized this fact by constantly making reference to the “good
faith of the State of Chile” with regard to its efforts to reform the constitution, and
345
346
347
348
349
350
351

The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 24, ¶ 62
Id. at 24–25, ¶ 52.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 19, ¶¶ 52, 53.
Id.
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the Chilean domestic judiciary’s “evident” disregard of international law due to its
lack of sophistication and understanding of international law.352 This critique was
stark, notwithstanding the fact, as mentioned above, that the Chilean Constitution
of 1980 does not establish a constitutional rank to human rights treaties in relation
to domestic constitutional law.
In this context the IACtHR had to ultimately decide whether the Supreme
Court of Justice of Chile had violated the Convention by delivering a judgment
consistent with its own constitutional traditions but contrary to the Inter-American
System. The IACtHR concluded that the prohibition established in the judicial
power’s decision “constitut[ed] prior censorship in violation of Article 13 of the
Convention.”353 It clarified that “the international responsibility of the State may
be engaged by acts or omissions of any power or organ of the State, whatsoever its
rank.”354 It also recognized that the origin of the violation rested in the text of the
Constitution that allowed the prior censorship because the text “determined the acts
of the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary.” 355 Yet, the Court also
“valuate[d] and underline[ed] the importance of the Government’s initiative in
proposing the constitutional reform, because it may lead to adapting domestic laws
to the content of the American Convention.”356 As a remedy, the Court ordered the
State to modify its Constitution in order to comply with the Convention, eliminate
prior censorship, and allow the film’s exhibition.357
Judge Cançado Trinidade’s concurring opinion was even more explicit on
the role that international courts should play regarding domestic jurisprudence that
contradicts the Convention and the decisions of the IACtHR.358 To him, it was the
duty of the Court “to keep insisting on the [State’s] legislative and judicial
obligations, besides the executive ones.”359 Recognizing the separation of powers
issues that could arise, Judge Trinidade explicitly stated that “[a]though
independent from the Executive Power, the Judicial Power is not independent from
the State, but quite on the contrary, it is part of the State, for international purposes,
as much as the Executive Power.”360 To him, “the question of the distribution of
competences, and the basic principle of the separation of powers, are of the greatest
relevance in the ambit of constitutional law, but in that of international law they are

352

The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 11 (citing expert Report of
Jose Zalaquett Daher).
353
Id. at 27, ¶ 71.
354
Id. at 27–28, ¶ 72.
355
Id. at 27–28, ¶ 72.
356
Id. at 33–34, ¶ 89.
357
The Last Temptation of Christ Merits, supra note 26, at 36, ¶ 103.
358
"The Last Temptation of Christ" (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile. Merits,
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 73, ¶ 6 (Feb. 5, 2001) (J.
Cançado Trindade, concurring) [hereinafter Opinion Cançado Last Temptation].
359
Id. at 4, ¶ 10.
360
Id. at 7, ¶ 18.
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nothing but facts, which have no incidence on the configuration of the international
responsibility of the State.”361
A few years later, after the decision of the IACtHR, Congress passed the
amended bill as presented by President Frei.362 The amendment substituted the prior
censorship mechanism for a system of cinematographic classification in order to
protect the rights of children to not be exposed to films that are not appropriate for
their age.363 Yet, films could not be forbidden from being screened in Chile.364 In
the end, the decision helped the legitimacy of the new governments to modify the
constitution, and also helped to send a signal to the domestic high courts that they
could be, through their interpretation of the constitution, internationally responsible
for human rights violations.
D. Costa Rica as a Case of Study: The Artavia Case Saga
1. The Constitutional Balance of Powers in Costa Rica
In contrast with the previous two cases, in the case of Costa Rica the
democratic system of government has not been affected by recent military coups.
The last time the constitutional order was threatened was in a failed military coup
in 1949.365 In fact, after the orchestrators of the coup were imprisoned the President
and the National Assembly modified the constitution to officially abolish the armed

361

Opinion Cançado Last Temptation, supra note 358, at 9, ¶ 22.
“The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo-Bustos et al.) v. Chile, Monitoring
Compliance with Judgment, 2003 Rep. Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 4 ¶19 (Nov.
28, 2003) (“The fifth report of the State of March 19, 2003, in which it declared that ‘on July
10, 2001, the National Congress adopted the draft constitutional reform designed to establish
the right to freedom of artistic creation and the elimination of cinematographic censorship,
substituting this by a classification system which w[ould] be regulated by law’; this draft was
promulgated and incorporated into the Constitution [Carta Fundamental ] on August 25,
2001, by publication of Act No. 19,742 in the Official Gazette of Chile. Chile also advised
that Act No. 19,846 (the Classification of Cinematographic Production Act) was published
and entered into force on January 4, 2003; its first article established a system to classify
cinematographic productions by age groups, designed to guide the adult population with
regard to the contents of cinematographic productions and to protect children and
adolescents, pursuant to the contents of various international treaties concluded by the
State.”).
363
Id.
364
Id.
365
Rodolfo Cerdas Cruz, Costa Rica since 1930, 7 CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF LATIN
AMERICA 357, 385–86 (1990). The failed military coup was orchestrated by the Minister of
Security, Edgar Cardona, with a group of military officers who took the Bellavista Fort. Id.
They demanded the destitution of President Jose Figueres, the elimination of the 10% income
tax and the nationalization of the banks. The President, with the help of loyal military
officers, was able to regain control the same day that the coup started. Id.
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forces, making this country one of the few around the world without an army.366
Despite the fact that Costa Rica, unlike most of Latin America, did not
have a military regime during the 1960s and 1970s, the country has had internal
political conflicts regarding the existing constitutional understandings. 367 Costa
Rican political parties have had deep political and ideological divisions since the
1940s.368 The biggest division has been between the National Liberation Party that
has a long history of center-left oriented policies (i.e. nationalization of banks,
enabling women and illiterates to vote, welfare legislation, constitutionally
guaranteed public education for all, guaranteed citizenship to black immigrants’
children) and the center-right party, the Social Christian Unity party, that is
traditionally connected with the coffee oligarchy and has an open Christian
democratic ideology (i.e. the party supported neoliberal economic reforms in the
late 1990s, it is in favor of the reduction of government’s spending, and it is openly
against abortion rights and same-sex marriage).369
The political polarization of Costa Rica has translated into four key
characteristics that affect presidential power, its relationship with the National
Assembly, and its ability to implement policy objectives. 370 First, there is a
constitutional prohibition on reelection for legislators, which also included the
presidency until 2003.371 Second, legislators are not elected directly by voters, but
rather by a proportionality system that allocates seats to the parties depending on a
formula linked to the overall percentage of votes received in the election.372 Third,
there is a limitation on the president’s veto authority over the budget law.373 Fourth,
the president is barred constitutionally from legislating by decree.374 Any type of
legislation must be negotiated with the Legislative Assembly, and as a consequence
“the most significant policy changes require legislative action, especially if they are
to be sustained over the long term.”375
Another consequence of these formal requirements is that congressional

366

David P. Barash, Costa Rica’s Peace Dividend: How Abolishing the Military Paid
Off, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 15, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/dec/15/opinion/la-oebarash-costa-rica-demilitarization-20131208.
367
Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq, Costa Rica: Paradise in Doubt, 16 J. DEMOCR. 140,
140–42 (2005).
368
See generally Cerdas Cruz, supra note 365.
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Id.
370
John M. Carey, Strong Candidates for A Limited Office: Presidentialism and
Political Parties in Costa Rica, PRES. DEMOCR. LAT. AM. 199, 202 (Scott Mainwaring &
Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (“The constitution of 1949
provides the Costa Rican president with complete authority over creation and maintenance
of the executive, but scant formal authority to influence legislation.”).
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Id. at 205–06.
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Lehoucq, supra note 367, at 144.
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Carey, supra note 370, at 202–03.
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Id. at 202.
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and presidential relations depend highly on partisan relations. 376 The fact that
legislators cannot be reelected makes it easier for them to aspire to careers outside
the legislature, and hence, it reduces their responsiveness to party leaders. 377
Moreover, the Legislative Assembly, due to the proportional system of election,
will always tend to be divided; the president’s party will not have full control of the
legislative body because the formula will always ensure that the opposition has
some proportional representation. Presidents will tend to face divided governments
and at the same time have few constitutional tools to force the legislative body into
adopting its policy objectives.378
2. Human Rights and the Constitutional Order.
The Inter-American system has a strong presence in Costa Rica. San Jose,
Costa Rica is where the IACtHR holds its regular sessions and the headquarters of
its staff. It is also the place where the American Convention was negotiated and
signed in 1969. Hence, it is of no surprise that the provisions of the Constitution
and the interpretation of the Supreme Court for the most part have been consistent
with the Latin American human rights movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s.
For example, Article 7 of the Constitution states that all international treaties that
have been duly approved by the Legislative Assembly have “authority superior to
that of the laws.”379 Moreover, Law No. 6889, adopted in September 1983, states
that the decisions of the IACtHR, once they have been transmitted to the domestic
judicial and administrative authorities, will have “the same executive force” as the
decisions of the Costa Rican courts.380
According to a 1995 decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the
Supreme Court, human rights treaties have the “same normative force” as the
constitution.381 This Chamber has also recognized that “Human Rights treaties in
376
Carey, supra note 370, at 205 (“The effectiveness of presidents or any other party
leader to shape policy is largely dependent on their ability to influence the actions of
legislators. This influence, in turn, is based on the ability to control the political careers of
legislators.”).
377
Id. (“[P]rohibitions on presidential reelection, which exist throughout most of Latin
America, undermine presidential authority over legislative copartisians, because legislators
know that incumbent presidents will not continue to hold their current position and so will
exert less control over legislator’s career prospects after a specified date.”).
378
Id. at 200 (“The shape of modern Costa Rican presidency is the result of a series
of events at midcentury: activist presidents, a brief civil war, and the subsequent Constituent
Assembly that codified strict limitations on presidential power.”).
379
CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE LA REPÚBLICA DE COSTA RICA, Artículo 7, 7 November
1949, translated in CONSTITUTIONPROJECT, COSTA RICA’S CONSTITUTION OF 1949 WITH
AMENDMENTS THROUGH 2011, https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Costa_Rica_
2011.pdf?lang=en.
380
Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 5.
381
Sentencia de 9 de mayo de 1995 emitida por la Sala Constitucional de la Corte
Suprema de Justicia de Costa Rica. Acción Inconstitucional. Voto 2313-95 (Expediente
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force in Costa Rica, not only have a similar value to the Political Constitution, but
also, when they give broader rights or guarantees to the person, they are above the
Constitution.” 382 On the relationship between the powers of the Constitutional
Chamber and the powers of the IACtHR to interpret the American Convention, the
Chamber stated in 1995 that it is just “natural and absolutely consequential” that the
reasoning of the IACtHR is binding on its own interpretation when it analyzes
violations to constitutional and universal human rights. 383 Years later this was
confirmed by the same Constitutional Chamber by arguing that “the decisions of
the [IACtHR] have full effect in our country.” 384 In sum, the Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica in the early years of the Inter
American System gave full force, even constitutional effects, to the American
Convention and the interpretations of the IACtHR.
The constitutional system forbids the president from regulating rights
through executive decrees in order to force him to reach a compromise with the
legislative assembly and ensure that there is no overreach of executive power. 385
The two provisions could be considered acceptable controls of presidential
authority and a positive engagement with international law and human rights
treaties. 386 As it will be explained below, this positive engagement backfired
recently in Artavia v. Costa Rica, in which instead of strengthening the role and
work of the Constitutional Chamber, the interaction ended up weakening the local
court’s discretion and expanding the power of the Costa Rican executive branch.
3. The Constitutional Chamber and the Right to Life
In 1995, President Jose Filgueres Olsen (1994-1998) from the center-left
National Liberation Party passed an Executive Decree regularizing the medical
practice of in vitro fertilization.387 After the executive decree entered into force a
group of conservative organizations challenged it on several grounds, including that
the president was regulating rights by decree and that they considered that the
technique did not protect the life of the embryos being used in the procedure.388
The case reached the Costa Rican Supreme Court in the year 2000. By then the
country had been ruled for two years by the center-right party, the Social Christian

0421-S-90), considerando VI, http://www.acnur.org/t3/fileadmin/Documentos/BDL/2012/
2844.pdf?view=1.
382
Id.
383
Id. at considerando VII.
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Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 5.
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Carey, supra note 370, at 202.
386
See generally Koh, supra note 146; Harold Hongju Koh, Trasnational Legal
Process, 75 NEB L. REV 181 (1996) (arguing that international law, by being integrated into
the domestic legal system, can reach high levels of positive engagement).
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Unity party.389
The Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court first declared that the
executive decree was unconstitutional because by regulating rights through an
executive decree it exceeded its constitutional powers. 390 Secondly, the Court
applied a “conventionality test” and held that the decree was unconstitutional on an
additional ground: it violated the American Convention.391 According to Article 4
of the Convention, life “shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment
of conception.”392 After analyzing conflicting medical reports, the Constitutional
Chamber concluded that there was no clear answer to whether the embryos created
in the laboratory were human beings and whether the medical procedure in the
laboratory could be analogized to the moment of conception. 393 Following a
progressive interpretation of rights, which implied always looking for the most
expansive protection, the Court concluded that the right to life meant extending the
protection to all those embryos created in the laboratory.394 It was safer to assume
389
THE STATESMAN’S YEARBOOK 2017: THE POLITICS, CULTURES AND ECONOMIES OF
WORLD, 364-65 (Pelgrave Mcmillan, 2016). This was not the first time the party had
ruled Costa Rica; it had done so from 1990 to 1994, yet this time it was able to remain in
power until 2006. Id.
390
Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 72; Corte Suprema, Sala Constitucional
[Supreme Court, Constittuional Chamber], Mar. 15, 2000, Sentencia: 02306, Expediente: 95001734-0007-CO, Considerando III. [hereinafter Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber
Sentencia 02306].
391
Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 72; Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia
02306, supra note 390, Considerandos V, VI, VII.
392
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4, Nov. 22, 1969 (“Every person has
the right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from
the moment of conception. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”).
393
Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390,
Considerando V.
394
Id. (“The question on when does life begins has a transcendental importance in the
issue being discussed here, because it forces us to define when a human will be subject to the
legal protection of our system. [A] person, the moment it has been conceived, is a person and
we are in front of a living being, and has to be protected by our legal system”) (my
translation); Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390,
Considerando VI (“Person is every human being (article 1.2) and ‘every person has the right
to recognition as a person before the law’ (article 3), both norms are of the [American
Convention] . . . . There is no other category for human being, we are all persons and the first
thing that our legal recognition as person demands is the recognition to the right to live,
without it there is no way to exercise our personality). Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber
Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, Considerando VII (“[F]rom the quoted norms and
especially from articles 21 of the Constitution, 4.1 of the American Convention on Human
Rights and 6.1 of the Convention of the Right of the Child it is clear that human life is
protected from the moment of conception, this has already been confirmed by this Chamber
in its earlier jurisprudence (674-90). This is the second premise [the first was the legality of
the executive order] on which we will analyze the constitutionality of the Decree on the
Technic of In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer (FIVET). The cited norms impose an
obligation to protect the embryo against any abuse to which it could be subjected to in a
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that there was life in the embryos until scientific tests could unanimously agree on
the question. 395 The state had an international obligation to “protect the embryo
against any abuse to which it could be subjected to in a laboratory, and especially
the gravest one of them, the possibility of eliminating its existence.” 396 Under the
Constitutional Chamber’s construction, the in vitro fertilization technique as
regulated by the decree did not provide those appropriate protections. 397 To the
contrary, the medical reports analyzed by the court showed that the existing in vitro
technique jeopardized the life and dignity of the human being by subjecting the
embryos to a process of selection, experimentation, and by exposing them to a
disproportional rate of mortality.398 The objectives pursued by the regulation, to
give a child to a family, were not justified because the “technique implie[d] an
elevated loss of embryos . . . whose life is first induced and then is frustrated in the
process.” 399
Having determined that the decree was unconstitutional, the Constitutional
Chamber nonetheless recognized that “science and biotechnology is rapidly
evolving and that the technique could reach a more effective procedure, and the
problems identified here be solved.” 400 Yet the conditions in which it was being
practiced at that time, led the Constitutional Chamber “to conclude that the
elimination or destruction of the conceived beings—voluntarily or as a consequence
of the malpractice of someone who employs the technique or out of its inaccuracy—
violates the rights to life.” 401
Regardless of the normative position that one can have on the substance of
the decision, one cannot fail to recognize that in the eyes of the Constitutional
laboratory, and especially the gravest one of them, the possibility of eliminating its
existence.”) (my translation).
395
Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390,
Considerando VIII (my translation).
396
Id. at Considerando VII (my translation).
397
Id. at Considerando VIII.
398
Id. at Considerando IX (my translation).
399
Id.
400
Costa Rica Constitutional Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, at
Considerando IX (my translation).
401
Id. (determining that “not even by enacting legislation, is it possible to authorize
legally the application of IVF, at least, as long as its scientific developments have not evolved
in the way that this decision has already explained and entails a conscious damage to human
life.”) (my translation). A minority of two Justices, Arguedas Ramirez and Calzada Miranda,
voted against the decision and presented a joint dissenting opinion. Costa Rica Constitutional
Chamber Sentencia 02306, supra note 390, Votos Disidentes Magistrados Arguedas Ramirez
y Calzada Miranda. They did so because, although they agreed that life in the Costa Rican
and Inter American system is recognized from the moment of conception, they considered
that the technique was the only way in which life could be protected when the parents had a
physical impossibility to have children. Id. The parents had a right to procreate, and they
considered that the technique did not violate the right to life of the embryos as long as they
are only used for the purposes of transferring them into the mother’s uterus. Id. The rights to
procreation to them, was a right to life in itself; and those who seek to give life, should be
able to do so by using all available techniques, including those that science offers them. Id.
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Chamber of Costa Rica, the court was exercising a progressive control of
conventionality. It was using the international treaty in its constitutional reasoning
to protect in the most expansive way the interest that it believed had to be protected.
The text of the American Convention was key for its identification of the moment
at which life is to be protected. Moreover, in the view of the Constitutional
Chamber, by recognizing that science could eventually protect the embryo in an
effective way, it construed the right to life in the most protective and progressive
way possible.402 It is safe to argue that the Court was not ignoring international
treaties or sticking to formalist interpretations to avoid resolving the issue; rather,
the court was being “progressive” by including additional sources like human rights
treaties and medical reports. Yet, it reached what some would classify as an
ideologically conservative conclusion.
4. The Proceedings Before the Inter-American System
A group of families that suffered from infertility alleged that the decision
of the Constitutional Chamber violated their right to procreate and their rights to
privacy.403 They brought a claim to the Inter-American Commission of Human
Rights in 2001. After a long period of discussions among the state, the victims, and
conflicting medical reports from witnesses, the Commission issued its merits report
in July 2010.404 It explained that the absolute prohibition of in vitro fertilization
established by the decision of the Constitutional Chamber was a violation of the
rights to privacy and to found a family. 405 It then recommended that the state,
among other things, enact legislation that would allow the practice.
By the time the state was notified of the merits reports in 2010, after almost
a decade of being out of power, the center-left National Liberation Party had
regained control of the presidency under the leadership of President Oscar Arias
(2006-2010).406 His party won control of the Legislative Assembly; it obtained 25
of the 57 seats. 407 In 2010, President Arias presented a bill to the Legislative
Assembly to comply with the recommendations of the Commission.408 In an effort
to address the concerns of the Constitutional Chamber, the bill included a
402

See generally Álvaro Paúl, Controversial Conceptions: The Unborn and the
American Convention on Human Rights, 9 LOY. UNIV. CHIC. INT'L L. REV. 209, (2012)
(arguing that the IACtHR committed several interpretative mistakes in order to impose a
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another protective result in favor of the embryos).
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Oscar Arias, Two-time President of Costa Rica and 1987 Nobel Peace Laureate,
HUFFPOST, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/author/oscar-arias (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
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prohibition of experimenting with and freezing embryos, and required all fertilized
eggs to be implanted without allowing the doctor to make a selection.409 The bill
received criticism from the legislative opposition and from the Pan-American
Health Organization (PAHO), which argued that the proposed regulation, by
forcing the doctors to implant all the embryos, would “increase the risk of
spontaneous abortions, obstetric complications, premature births and neonatal
morbidity,” thus endangering “the woman’s right to life, and even cause a
therapeutic abortion which, in turn, negatively affects the enjoyment of the rights
to health and other related human rights.”410 The bill was rejected by the legislative
body leaving the Constitutional Chamber’s ban in force.411
In light of the failure of the state to allow for the practice to take place in
Costa Rica, the Commission then took the case to the IACtHR.412 The Commission
argued that the victims’ suffering “[was] a fundamental and decisive consequence
of the Constitutional Chamber’s judgment.”413 It further described the result of the
Constitutional Chamber’s decisions as a prohibition of an “absolute nature” that
constituted a restriction of the rights to found a family.414 In terms of remedies, the
Commission requested the Court to order, among other things, “lift[ing] the ban on
in vitro fertilization”415 and that “the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court
of Justice carry out a public act in order to apologize to the victims for the violation
of their human rights and for the pain and suffering caused to them, acknowledging
publicly that, because of its judgment, this judicial organ thwarted the life project
of the victims.”416
The State designated two officers of the Attorney General’s Office
(Procuraduría General de la República) as its representatives. 417 The State’s
response to the claims by the Commission were mainly based on the medical reports
analyzed by the Constitutional Chamber and their conflicting results on the
plausible health effects on both the mother and the embryos.418 On the issue of the
ruling of the Constitutional Chamber, the state argued that the decision was a
“relative ban” on the practice because it “did not annul definitely the possibility of
practicing in vitro fertilization in Costa Rica, [but] only banned a specific technique
that had existed since 1995.”419 It further added that as soon as the “state considers
that a technique is compatible with those parameters [the ones set by the
Constitutional Chamber on reducing percentage of failure cases], it may permit and
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regulate it.” 420 In sum, the State did not defend the fact that the Constitutional
Chamber was arguing for a more extensive protection of the right to life than the
one considered by the Inter-American Commission.
The IACtHR agreed with the Commission’s assessment that the case
rested on determining “whether [the] decisions by the Constitutional Chamber
entailed the State’s international responsibility,” 421 and “resulted in a
disproportionate restriction of the rights of the presumed victims.”422 It even argued
that there was no need to review the evidence presented by the State regarding the
scientific and medical consequences of the technique because the merits of the case
were based on the effect of the decisions of the Costa Rican Supreme Court.423 That
is, it was a procedure focused on analyzing whether or not the Constitutional Court
had correctly interpreted the American Convention in light of the facts presented to
it. Yet, the State did not present a full defense of the Constitutional Chamber’s
reasoning. The IACtHR reviewed the ruling of the highest court of Costa Rica as
an appellate court would review the work of a trial court.
The IACtHR first stated that the Constitutional Chamber’s standard
implied that for the technique to be constitutional it would need to ensure that there
was no embryonic loss whatsoever.424 In practice, this would entail “a prohibition
of IVF, because the evidence in the case file indicated that, to date, there is no option
for practicing IVF without some possibility of embryonic loss.”425 In other words,
“it would be impossible to comply with the condition imposed by the Chamber.”426
The IACtHR criticized the decision of the Constitutional Chamber for not having
“sufficient precision” and making it difficult for the plaintiffs and other authorities
to follow.427
The IACtHR first reviewed the definitions of the term “conception” as
established both in scientific affidavits and in the dictionary of the Spanish
language.428 It concluded that conception should be understood as the moment in
which embryos are implanted, not when they are created as argued by the
Constitutional Chamber. 429 The Convention could not extend its protection to the
embryos in the laboratory.430 The Court could have stopped its analysis there but it
420
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then reviewed the level of protection that the Convention gives to the right to life.431
It took the position that the Convention does not give an absolute protection to
life.432 It eventually reached the conclusion that “it is not feasible to maintain that
an embryo is the holder of and exercises the rights established in each of these
articles. Also, taking into account, as indicated previously, that conception can only
take place within a woman’s body [through implantation].”433 Consequently, “the
direct subject of protection is fundamentally the pregnant woman, because the
protection of the unborn child is implemented essentially through the protection of
the woman.”434
The IACtHR then applied a proportionality test to the decision of the
Constitutional Chamber of Costa Rica. It explained that it was not admissible that
the chamber argued in its decision that its constitutional norms “grant a greater
protection to the right to life and, therefore, proceed to give this right absolute
protection . . . this approach deni[ed] the existence of rights that may be the object
of disproportionate restrictions owing to the defense of the absolute protection of
the right to life, which would be contrary to the protection of human rights.”435 On
the issue of the risks of high embryonic death, the IACtHR argued that it was
“disproportionate to aspire to an absolute protection of the embryo in relation to a
risk that is common and even inherent in process where the IVF technique has not
been used.”436 The IACtHR found that the decision of the Constitutional Chamber
was an “arbitrary and excessive interference in private and family life” because it
had failed to take into consideration other competing rights.437
The Artavia decision is a clear example of a conflict of interpretation
431
Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶ 189 (affirming that “the term ‘in general’ infers
exceptions to a rule.” At points in the decision the IACtHR seemed to imply that the original
intent of the drafters of the American Convention was to let the state decide the scope of this
protection).
432
Id. ¶ 220 (referencing further the fact that the Inter-American Commission had
previously declared in two cases brought against the United States’ Supreme Court’s
decisions to legalize abortion in the sense that “the protection of the rights to life was not
absolute.”).
433
Id. ¶ 222.
434
Id.
435
Id. ¶ 259.
436
Artavia Merits, supra note 129, ¶¶ 311, 313–14 (“[T]aking into account that
embryonic losses that occur in a natural pregnancy and in other reproduction techniques
permitted in Costa Rica, the protection of the embryo sought by banning IVF has a very
limited and moderate scope . . . a weighting up of the severity of the limitation of the rights
involved in this case as compared to the importance of the protection of the embryo allows
it to be affirmed that the effects on the rights to personal integrity, personal liberty, private
life, intimacy, reproductive autonomy, access to reproductive health services, and to found a
family is sever and entails a violation of these rights because, in practice, they are annulled
for those persons whose only possible treatment for infertility is IVF. In addition, the
interference had a differentiated impact on the victims owing to their situation of disability,
gender stereotypes and, for some of the victims, to their financial situation.”).
437
Id. ¶ 189.
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between courts. This was not a case in which a domestic court was ignoring human
rights and the international court needed to enforce them; rather, this case
exemplified a conflict between courts on what was the best way to interpret human
rights and the most effective way to protect them. The IACtHR disagreed with the
highest Court of Costa Rica on how to interpret the Convention in the most
protective way possible. For the highest court of Costa Rica, the most expansive
protection included the embryo; for the IACtHR the most expansive interpretation
could not entail “absolute” protection, but rather balancing the right to life with
those of other victims.
The IACtHR ordered state authorities to “take the appropriate measures to
ensure that the prohibition of the practice of IVF is annulled as rapidly as
possible.” 438 As part of its remedies, the Court ordered the Costa Rica Social
Security Institute to “make IVF available within its health care infertility treatments
and programs, in accordance with the obligation to respect and guarantee the
principle of non-discrimination.”439
When the decision of the IACtHR was issued in 2012, Costa Rica was still
governed by a president from the center-left party, Laura Chinchilla (2010-2014),
and the Legislative Assembly remained divided (President Chinchilla’s party had
only 24 of the 57 seats in the Assembly). In the two years after the decision of the
IACtHR, President Chinchilla presented several drafts to the Legislative Assembly
to regulate the in vitro fertilization procedures.440 All of those projects failed to
become legislation. 441 Moreover, the victims presented several local judicial
amparo proceedings to have the decision of the IACtHR recognized by the judiciary
and requested them to leave without effects the 2000 decision of the Constitutional
Chamber. 442 A majority of the Constitutional Chamber rejected the amparo
requests. 443 In a clear departure from its previous attitude towards the InterAmerican system, the Constitutional Chamber argued that it was not its duty to
order or supervise compliance with the IACtHR’s decisions.444
In June 2015, the President decided to enact another executive decree to
regulate the IVF technique.445 This time, the executive argued that the decree was
the only available means for the State to comply with the decision of the IACtHR.446
The decree was once again challenged in the Constitutional Chamber with similar
arguments to the ones expressed in the 2000 decision, and the decree was declared
as unconstitutional.447 The Constitutional Chamber recognized “the effort of the
438
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Executive Power to give full compliance to the decisions of the IACtHR” but noted
that “the means are not justified by the ends, especially when these means breach
in an open and manifest way values, principles and nuclear norms of [the Costa
Rican] republican order.”448 The inter-branch political conflict was clear from this
decision. The Constitutional Chamber was asked to modify the constitutional rules
that balanced the political forces’ powers. Setting a precedent in which the
president can regulate rights through decrees was more dangerous for the
constitutional order than ignoring the decisions of the supranational human rights
court.
5. Imposing an Unconstitutional Executive Decree
In February 2016, the IACtHR monitored the compliance with the
decision and found that its orders had not been fully implemented.449 It criticized
the Constitutional Chamber for not taking the opportunity to reverse its own
decisions when the victims requested an amparo to execute the IACtHR’s
decision.450 It further argued that the Constitutional Chamber, as the highest court
in Costa Rica, has “the important role of complying or implementing the decision
of the IACtHR.”451 The IACtHR noted the different attitudes from local powers
towards the supranational system. It “value[d] positively the effort of the Executive
Power to leave without effect the IVF prohibition through the emission of a legal
norm, and consider[ed] that that effort represent[ed] a clear and concrete will to
comply with the decision of the IACtHR.”452
In its latest decision, the IACtHR left without “any legal effects” the
decision of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice of Costa
Rica. 453 Moreover, it affirmed that:
executive by regulating rights in executive orders, a power only granted to the legislative
assembly. Id. It even argued that the American Convention by stating that the rights to life
should be regulated “in general by law” confirms the view that it cannot be regulated thought
an executive decree. Acción de Inconstitucionalidad Presentada en contra del Decreto
Ejecutivo No. 39210-MP-S, (Sept. 21, 2015); Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note
27, at 9.
448
Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 10.
449
Id.
452
Id. at 7–8.
451
Id.
452
Id. at 9.
453
Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 12–13 (“According to what was
declared by this Court in its resolution, the prohibition to practice IVF is manifestly
incompatible with the American Convention due to the fact that it violates those rights [to
privacy and family], and as such, it cannot have any legal effects in Costa Rica nor constitute
an impediment for the exercise of such a right protected by the Convention. Consequently,
in accordance with the American Convention and the remedies ordered in the Decision, it
must be clear that IVF from now on is authorized in Costa Rica and, in an immediate way,
the exercise of the right to decide to have biological sons or daughters through the assisted
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it must be clear that FIV from now on is authorized in Costa Rica
and, in an immediate way, the exercise of the right to decide to
have biological sons or daughters through the assisted technic
must be allowed, both at the private and public level, without the
need to have any additional legal act or decision.454
With regard to the executive decree that regulated the practice, the
IACtHR ordered to “keep in force the Decree so that there is no illusory exercise of
the rights . . . this does not imply that the legislative power could enact eventually
some type of regulation that complies with the standards of the decision of the
IACtHR.”455
Eduardo Vio Grossi was the only dissenting judge in the decision.456 He
argued that the IACtHR had very limited powers to monitor compliance with its
decisions and that in this case it was exceeding them by signaling concrete
responsibilities to domestic actors.457 He even made reference to the need to give a
“margin of appreciation” to the domestic authorities to comply with the state’s
international obligations. 458 Without the “margin of appreciation,” the court would
be invading the scope of domestic legal actors in a way contrary to international
law.459 Moreover, Judge Vio Grossi identified the risk of getting the Court involved
in a separation of powers issue between the local high court and the executive
power. 460 In practice, the international resolution classified local courts as human
rights violators, and at the same time, legitimized the acts of the executive.461 In
his view, the IACtHR should not be in the business of resolving internal struggles
among powers on how best to comply with international decisions.462

technic must be allowed, both at the private and public level, without the need to have any
additional legal act or decision that recognizes this possibility or that regulates the
implementation of such a technique. No one can impose a penalty to engage in the practice
of IVF.”) (my translation).
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Artavia Monitoring Compliance, supra note 27, at 12–13.
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Id. at 15 (arguing that the Decree should stay in force because neither the victims
nor the Commission had argued that the decree violated any rights and that in fact it was an
appropriate way to comply with the IACtHR decision).
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I/A Court HR. Case of Artavia Murillo et al. ("In vitro fertilization") v. Costa Rica.
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VI. LESSONS FROM THE UNITED STATES AND INTER-AMERICAN
EXPERIENCE
The comparative analysis presented in the previous sections between the
US system of adjudication and the Inter-American system of human rights confirms
the claim that judicial supremacy has not only resulted from courts’ doctrinal
interpretations, but also from political actors’ incentives to recognize and promote
it.463 High courts at the domestic level and international tribunals rely on political,
social and economic actors to enforce their decisions. At the international level, the
lack of a political entity or a strong economic integration process, such as in the
European Union, lowers the costs for presidents to dismiss the authority or ignore
the opinions of supranational courts.464
The first lesson from the comparative analysis is that the expansion of the
IACtHR has been possible in some Latin American states because recognizing such
an authority has been politically beneficial to executive powers and their political
coalitions. The IACtHR’s authority has helped presidents overcome a variety of
political dilemmas inherent in emerging democracies. It has helped to dismantle
conservative judiciaries, bypass gridlock in congresses, impose agendas on preexisting coalitions, and generally divert the political costs of certain decisions into
the international system as opposed to facing them directly.
This lesson does not imply that all domestic judiciaries have been passive
in this process. There are several examples of constitutional judges who have
contested the conventional authority of the supranational court.465 They have had
to grapple simultaneously with both the requirements of the Constitution and of the
Convention; in some cases they have tried to reach an understanding with the
supranational court. The IACtHR is not the only voice that speaks in the name of
human rights, and for some judiciaries the IACtHR has failed to be an adequate
voice. The example of the Chilean Supreme Court and the Constitutional Chamber
of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica presented in previous sections serve as
testimonies to these tensions.
The second lesson that emerges from the comparative findings of this
paper is that the use of the supranational adjudication system to expand executive
powers brings into question existing assumptions on the need to make international
law directly enforceable at the domestic level. 466 In the context of the US
constitutional system, this lesson is a call for caution to the proponents of giving
self-executing power to decisions of international courts in the domestic legal
system.467 If the decisions from international courts are given direct legal effect,
463
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like the Costa Rican case, they can substantially affect the balance of power among
governmental actors. Just as the US Supreme Court’s judicial supremacy can be
used by actors to bypass politics and advance agendas, so too can the decisions of
international courts be used to impose policies on Congress, the highest court of the
land, the states, and federal agencies. In the context of comparative law and new
democracies, existing theories argue that supranational adjudicative institutions can
help domestic judiciaries become more independent and enhance their role in
governance. 468 To reach this conclusion, they build on studies focused on the
experience of the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human
Rights.469 In the case of Europe, scholars argue that the fragmentation of judicial
authority between national and supranational courts made it difficult for
governments to “retaliate” the expansion of judicial power at the domestic level.470
The commentators of this literature insist that international institutions are a
structural factor that helps expand judicial power by “protecting and fostering
democracy and expanding human rights.” 471 Yet, as the comparative analysis
between the United States and the Inter-American system shows, supranational
judiciaries can also have the opposite effect.
When a domestic political coalition or incoming political leaders disagree
with the existing constitutional understandings or the policy preference of the
domestic court, they may use the supranational proceeding to steer the direction of
the domestic court. The new government can use the IACtHR’s expansive
jurisprudence as a tool to impose a different understanding coated under the
narrative of international judicial supremacy, and avoid criticism for expanding
presidential powers. Cloaked by a human rights narrative is an assailment of judicial
discretion and an expansion of presidential power. The European based literature
has failed to recognize this fact. By relying exclusively on the experience of
European countries and their interaction with the European Union institutions, they
generally see an ally of domestic judiciaries in the supranational system.472
In the view of the European-centered literature, when courts and the
political coalitions in power do not have the same policy agenda, political actors
that the Supremacy Clause of the US constitution should be interpreted as establishing a
default rule that treaties should be directly enforceable in domestic courts like other laws).
468
See generally L.R. Helfer, Redesigning the European Court of Human Rights:
Embeddedness as a Deep Structural Principle of the European Human Rights Regime, 19
EUR. J. INT'L. L. 125, 132 (2008); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19; Helfer & Slaughter,
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will downplay the role of domestic courts by replacing judicial personnel, altering
appointment procedures, or introducing changes in the court’s jurisdiction.473 The
conclusions presented in this paper contradict this view in two ways. First, there
might be cases in which the conflict between the existing judiciary and an incoming
political coalition is not one of judiciaries expanding their role in politics, but rather
regards a substantive disagreement on which agenda to pursue. This is not an attack
on judicial power itself, but rather an attack on the use of judicial activism to impose
a squarely progressive or conservative agenda. Secondly, as mentioned in the
previous sections, it might be politically costly for the new coalitions to constrain
judicial powers in regions where hyper-presidentialism or a history of
authoritarianism is still present in the minds of the general population. NGOs,
political opposition, and political parties, among others, would reject an upfront
attack to the judiciary. Moreover, in cases in which the government is divided there
might be some domestic political actors that are in line with the court’s policy
position. The other political coalitions or leaders might have a harder time using
these traditional mechanisms to downplay the role of domestic courts.
The final lesson that can be learned from this paper’s comparative analysis
is that allowing other branches of government to express their concerns in the
judicial system does not necessary lead to negative results. In the United States, the
possibility of allowing some type of participation, even if it is only in the form of
an amicus brief, leads the court to consider all the interests of the parties that are
affected by its decisions. In the long run, this makes the court a more conscientious
institution regarding the limits of its powers. In the words of former Attorney
General Griswold, the “judicial system presupposes that the clash of arguments
presented by professional adversaries is the most reliable process for determining
the legality of any activity.”474 Courts reach better decisions when more arguments
are considered, and especially when the voices of everyone involved in the process
are heard.
One of the critiques of the Inter-American system is its lack of sensitivity
regarding the local political, legal, and social realities, 475 especially through its
remedies orders.476 Perhaps listening to all of the government actors involved in
the case would enhance the Court’s sensitivity and invite it to make decisions more
attuned to the realities of the state. Today, the IACtHR judges are only getting to
know the country through the lenses of the NGOs representing the victims, the
Inter-American Commission, and the executive powers. We must recognize that
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these are only depicting the story that serves their strategic interests. The rest of
state actors, including the high courts, are left without a defense.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper considered an assumption about contemporary international
adjudicatory proceedings involving governmental acts, which government
representatives will always defend the state in the best way possible, and found it
to be contradictory, or at least uneasy. The comparison of the defense of the US
federal government before the Supreme Court and of the Latin American states in
the IACtHR shows that the assumption only holds true when the interest of the
executive aligns with the interest of the other branches being defended. In many
occasions at the international level, this has not been the case. Today the interest
of the state is composed of diverse agendas and it is not clear how to synthesize and
reconcile them, particularly in the face of salient cases that define key constitutional
understandings.
As this paper explained, the US constitutional litigation system has
developed a set of strategies to mitigate advantages that come with the monopoly
of the executive power over the defense of the state.477 The US Supreme Court has
not been prevented from hearing diverse interests involved in the cases. Congress
has filed amicus briefs, granted litigating authority to independent federal agencies,
and pressured the DOJ to include its interests.478 Moreover, in some cases, private
litigants have framed their claims against executive authority using arguments that
defend congressional powers.479 In other cases, the litigation strategies of the DOJ
have also reflected an effort to represent the interest of all branches.480 This office
has presented the views of different branches in briefs or in footnotes or in oral
argument. However, as this paper explained, in salient cases it has also been
persuaded by the White House to decline to defend other branches, confessed errors
in court, or argued directly against the acts of other branches. The latter consists of
few cases in the life of US constitutional adjudication, yet they reveal the impact
that the authority to present arguments in court has for inter-branch politics.
Once the analysis is broadened to include the political effects of the
litigation strategies, it becomes immediately clear that in the contexts of divided
government, presidents can use the judicial process to expand their agenda.481 In
the face of congressional opposition these presidents can try to modify political
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understandings by seeking an alliance with the judiciary.482 The monopoly over the
defense of the government in constitutional adjudication and the reaffirmation of
judicial supremacy by the court can be used to expand the power of the executive.
As this paper explained, this does not always happen, as there are some mitigation
mechanisms available to Congress.v Yet, the potential for the expansion is clear.
This paper also made the case that supranational adjudication in the InterAmerican System of Human Rights shares some of the characteristics of the US
system of constitutional adjudication. This paper discussed how the IACtHR is
assuming constitutional functions, especially through its assertion of judicial
supremacy over human rights litigation in the region. 483 This assertion is
manifested when it strikes down domestic legislation, constitutional norms and acts
of different branches; it is also manifested by the decisions in which it reviews the
work of constitutional courts as if they were lower courts and it affirms the superior
hierarchy of its decisions over domestic constitutional doctrines. This supranational
judicial expansion runs contrary to the original vision of the institution to cooperate
with domestic judiciaries, and to foster the empowerment of domestic high courts.
There are many reasons why this doctrinal expansion has been possible,
including the fact that Latin American constitutions have given the highest
deference to human rights covenants. Yet, there is also a political variable on the
expansion of the court. There has been a willingness of some executives to use the
monopoly of the defense of the state and the IACtHR’s assertion of judicial
supremacy to impose policy agendas in scenarios of dived governments, and against
previous political coalitions.
In sum, just as in the US domestic system the Supreme Court can be used
to expand executive powers over Congress or independent agencies, the IACtHR
can be used to expand Latin American executive powers over local judiciaries. The
centralization of the defense of the state is one of the political tools that allow this
to happen. The centralization takes away the power of certain branches or agencies
to uphold their agenda before a judicial body. In the most extreme cases, the
executive could decline to defend the interest of the other branches of government
when the issues discussed in court can help this branch expand its own powers,
ignore the constitution, or impose its policy agenda. Note the paradox here. In the
US system, the acquiescence of the executive serves also the Supreme Court
because it reaffirms its judicial supremacy over the Constitution.484 When we add
to the adjudicatory process a supranational court, the power of the domestic high
court is supplanted by the supremacy of an international body. Constitutional courts
lose their control over the content of the constitutions and of rights litigation, a
control than now is asserted by a supranational court.
The IACtHR’s experience shows the success and tragedy of the assertion
of international judicial supremacy by a supranational court. As the international
human rights adjudication system expands its influence, behaving more as a
482
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484
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constitutional court than as a dispute resolution body, the political actors that control
the judicial process are the ones who can manipulate it on their behalf.485 The rest
of the state actors, including the high courts, are left without a defense, and the
expansion of the international judiciary has the potential of expanding the agenda
of the domestic executive instead of the power of local high courts.
This conclusion contradicts liberal international law scholars who would
predict that the expansion of international judiciaries would come hand in hand with
the expansion of domestic judiciaries’ powers and discretion.486 In this scholarly
literature, independent local judiciaries are supposedly a precondition for an
effective international judiciary. 487 The story of the IACtHR shows that the
expansion of the international judiciary has the potential of expanding the agenda
of the domestic executive instead of the power of local high courts.488 Instead of
engaging in a dialogue in which the domestic and the international courts nurture
each other, a process of imposition and submission is emerging in which the
domestic high court loses independence and discretion in rights interpretation.489

485

ALTER, supra note 6 (discussing how international courts can perform other
functions beyond dispute resolution).
486
See generally Koh, supra note 146; Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization,
40 VA. J. INT'L L. 1103 (1999); Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 253; Helfer & Slaughter,
supra note 19.
487
Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 19; Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 253; Koh, supra
note 386; Koh, supra note 146.
488
Contra supra note 486.
489
Huneeus, supra note 138 (discussing a view on how domestic courts resist
international ones, yet the author takes the position that their resistance can be explained as
a lack of adequate international persuasion by arguing that local courts need to be “nurtured”
into a human rights culture).

636

Arizona Journal of International & Comparative Law

Vol. 34, No. 3

2017

